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The Effect of Court-Ordered Hiring Quotas on the Composition
and Quality of Police
By JUSTIN MCCRARY*
Arguably the most aggressive affirmative action program ever implemented in the
United States was a series of court-ordered racial hiring quotas imposed on
municipal police departments. My best estimate of the effect of court-ordered
affirmative action on work-force composition is a 14-percentage-point gain in the
fraction African American among newly hired officers. Evidence on police performance is mixed. Despite substantial black-white test score differences on police
department entrance examinations, city crime rates appear unaffected by litigation.
However, litigation lowers slightly both arrests per crime and the fraction black
among serious arrestees. (JEL H76, J15, J78, K31)

affirmative action remedies into the 1990s.1 By
the standards of current affirmative action proposals, these measures are remarkably interventionist. In this paper, I address two key issues.
First, did these affirmative action policies succeed in raising the fraction of police officers
who were African American, or did they merely
ratify preexisting trends? Second, what effect
did court-ordered changes in hiring policies
have on stated police department objectives, in
particular crime reduction?
Evaluating the magnitude of these impacts is
challenging. First, suitable data—in particular,
historical information on black employment
share and information on the pattern of litigation—are not publicly available. I use a new
panel dataset on 314 large American cities from
1960 to the present. To measure employment of
African American police, I combine confidential information from the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC) with published data from historical sources. To measure
the onset of litigation against departments in
this sample, I use published court decisions.
Information on black employment share and
litigation is combined with information on city
demographics from the Census Bureau and on

Arguably the most aggressive affirmative action program ever implemented in the United
States was a series of court-ordered racial hiring
quotas imposed on municipal police departments. These quotas arose out of a wave of class
action employment discrimination lawsuits filed
in the federal district courts beginning in 1969.
Court-ordered affirmative action in this sector
has been both aggressive and persistent: Boston
and Cambridge, Massachusetts, remain to this
day subject to hiring quotas first imposed in
1973, and Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, and
Montgomery, Alabama, labored under similar
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Ken Chay, John DiNardo, Guido Imbens, Jonathan Leonard,
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1

Castro v. Beecher, 365 F. Supp. 655, 660 – 662 (D.
Mass. 1973), and personal communication with Toni Wolfman; Freeman v. City of Philadelphia, 751 F. Supp. 509
(E.D. Penn. 1990); and U.S. v. City of Montgomery, 957 F.
Supp. 1241 (M.D. Ala. 1997).
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police staffing, arrests, and crimes from the
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI).
The second evaluation challenge regards
selection—litigated departments are not necessarily directly comparable with unlitigated
departments. Both private litigants and the Department of Justice (DOJ) targeted those employers with the largest number of potential
black jobs at stake— big departments with disparities between departmental black employment share and the city fraction African
American. To circumvent this selection problem, I take advantage of the staggered timing of
litigation against police departments and focus
on event study estimates of litigation’s impact,
as in Louis S. Jacobson, Robert J. LaLonde, and
Daniel G. Sullivan (1993). Administrative delays in the processing of complaints by the
EEOC, as well as capacity constraints facing the
Employment Section of the Civil Rights Division of the DOJ in the early years of enforcement, led to substantial and plausibly
exogenous variation in the timing of litigation
against police departments.2
A third evaluation challenge is that unlitigated departments may have responded to the
general phenomenon of litigation by increasing
black employment share, confounding the direct
effect of litigation with the effect of the threat of
litigation. I address this question empirically by
comparing the evolution of work-place demographics in unlitigated departments before and
after the litigation of other departments in the
same federal district.
The empirical analysis points to several important conclusions. First, despite substantial
initial differences, by 1999 litigated and unlitigated cities employed black workers at similar
rates, conditional on city demographics. Second, initial differences, per se, are not important
enough to account for the gains accruing to
2
For example, in 1977 the National Association of Government Employees (NAGE) filed charges with the EEOC
alleging discrimination by San Antonio against Mexican
Americans. The EEOC referred the case to the DOJ in 1980.
The DOJ acknowledged in 1989 that it had lost the paperwork for the case, and the trial did not proceed until 1989
(NAGE v. City Public Service Board of San Antonio, 40 F.
3d 698, 702). For introductory material on the variety of
delays encountered by plaintiffs seeking to file an employment discrimination case, see for example Barbara Lindemann Schlei and Paul Grossman (1976), David L. Rose
(1989), and Frank J. Landy (2005).
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litigated cities. Third, event study analyses
indicate that the convergence in employment
patterns between litigated and unlitigated departments occurred entirely in the years following litigation. My best estimate of the
25-year gain in black employment share is on
the order of 10 percentage points. Using firstorder Markov approximations outlined in Section II, I estimate that this corresponds to a
14-percentage-point increase in the hiring fraction African American following litigation.
Fourth, there is little evidence of litigation
threat effects. Unlitigated departments in federal districts with litigated departments are no
more likely to hire African Americans after
litigation than they were before. Fifth and finally, there is mixed evidence of differences in
police performance between litigated and unlitigated departments, but the bulk of the evidence
suggests little to no effect. City crime rates,
arrest rates, and the racial composition of arrestees all appear to be at best modestly related to
litigation. Court-ordered affirmative action in
municipal police departments may thus be an
example of an affirmative action program with a
substantial impact on work-force composition
but a generally minor impact on productivity.
These findings relate primarily to two literatures. The first of these is concerned with the
impact of federal government labor market interventions on black economic progress (Richard B. Freeman 1973; Orley Ashenfelter and
James J. Heckman 1976; Charles Brown 1984;
Jonathan S. Leonard 1990; John J. Donohue and
Heckman 1991). An important topic for this
literature has been assessing the impact of the
federal contractor program, which obliges firms
that do business with the federal government to
engage in affirmative action (e.g., Leonard
1984b). The literature’s consensus is that the
federal contractor program has had somewhat
modest effects on black economic outcomes
(James P. Smith and Finis Welch 1989; Leonard
1990). A few articles have sought to estimate
the impact of court-ordered affirmative action
on black economic outcomes (e.g., Andrea H.
Beller 1978), but as noted by Donohue and
Heckman (1991), no consensus has emerged on
the evidence, and interpretation is difficult due
to endogeneity problems. Phyllis A. Wallace
(1976) gives a detailed analysis of the impact of
court-ordered affirmative action for AT&T.
Using industry-level data on class action em-

320

THE AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW

ployment discrimination litigation, black employment, and productivity, Leonard (1984a)
estimates small productivity impacts of courtordered affirmative action.
The second literature to which this paper
contributes is the economics of crime, particularly the subliterature focused on police performance. The role of race in policing is a
long-standing subject of general interest in
the American urban context (William Kephart
1957; National Advisory Commission on Civil
Disorders 1968; W. Marvin Dulaney 1996). Recently, the topic has attracted the attention of
economists (e.g., John Knowles, Nicola Persico,
and Petra Todd 2001; Kate L. Antonovics and
Brian Knight 2004). John R. Lott (2000) presents an analysis related to that here, focusing
on the impact of affirmative action on city crime
rates. Donohue and Steven D. Levitt (2001) take
a broader view and estimate the general impact
of police department racial composition on the
racial composition of arrestees using panel data.
The remainder of the paper is organized as
follows. Section I describes the aspect of police
hiring procedures that were the subject of litigation and discusses the legal rationale for judicial intervention into hiring practices. In
Section II, a unique administrative dataset is
used to examine the racial composition of new
hires for Chicago, Illinois, before and after litigation, and Markov approximations are used to
convert estimated impacts on black employment share into impacts on black hiring share.
Sections III and IV present evidence on the
impact of litigation on black employment share
and police performance, respectively, while
Section V concludes. Appendix I describes the
data used, and Appendix II provides details on
the Markov approximations used.

MARCH 2007

hiring, such as a criminal record check, it is
generally agreed that the primary stumbling
block to hiring is performance on the entrance
examination. Thus, police department selection
methods are essentially the employment equivalent of the William G. Bowen and Derek Bok
(1998, 31– 42) model of race-neutral college
admissions.
Many police department entrance exams, especially in the prelitigation years, were aptitude
tests akin to the verbal SAT. Detroit administered a three-hour I.Q. test (the “Otis”) to applicants in the 1960s and into the 1970s.4 Over
the same period, the District of Columbia used
a civil service examination designed for positions in the federal bureaucracy. This test comprised 80 questions on vocabulary, reading
comprehension, and analogies. These questions
clearly measure aptitude, but are not related in
any obvious way to police work.5 For example,
two questions are:
“[13.] The purpose of trademarks is to
(A) show that a tax has been paid (B)
distinguish the brand of goods manufactured (C) show that a patent has been
granted (D) indicate that goods are unadulterated (E) distinguish home from
foreign products.
[14.] CRISP means most nearly (A)
broken (B) frosty (C) brittle (D) burnt (E)
dry.”
The use of aptitude tests in police hiring is
ongoing, largely because civil service regulations require that some sort of test be used, and
because departments and judges agree that quality police work requires some degree of aptitude. For example, the Memphis Police
Department continues to use an I.Q. test to

I. Background

For much of the twentieth century, municipal
police departments have been required by state
and local civil service regulations to hire in rank
order by police department entrance examination.3 Although there are other aspects to police
3

Rank order hiring is mitigated to a certain extent by the
so-called “Rule of Two” or the “Rule of Three,” and by the
requirement that those with sufficiently high scores pass
additional hurdles, such as a background investigation or
physical examination. Myrdal (1944, 539, fn. b) notes the

prevalence of civil service systems in the North and South
already by the 1940s, although he does not mention entrance
examinations specifically. George Greisinger, Jeffrey S.
Slovak, and Joseph J. Molkup (1979, 26) note that “[b]y the
early 20th century civil service systems based on the merit
principle were established in many state and local governments. Since then, they have grown in numbers at a very
rapid pace, so that by the contemporary era they have
become almost ubiquitous.”
4
Baker v. City of Detroit, 483 F. Supp. 930, 948 –952
(E.D. Mich., 1979).
5
Davis v. Washington, 512 F. 2d 956, 975 (D.C. Cir.,
1975). The entire test is reproduced in the Appendix to the
majority decision.
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screen its applicants.6 Generally, police departments being litigated were not able to demonstrate statistically a relationship between
performance on the job and entrance examination scores. In a particularly careful study of the
New York City Police Department entrance examination, Bernard Cohen and Jan M. Chaiken
(1972, xiv) conclude that “the entrance examination for patrolmen does not appear to predict
any aspect of job performance measured in this
study, other than the ability to pass later civil
service examinations for promotion.”
African American applicants, historically as
well as today, do not perform as well as white
applicants on police department entrance examinations.7 For example, in the Detroit, Michigan,
exams of 1967 to 1971, the African American
pass rate was 44.3 percent, and the white pass rate
was 80.7 percent. The Memphis, Tennessee, tests
administered from 1981 to 1989 had a similar
impact on black applicants. The pass rate for
whites was a high 96.7 percent, but that for African Americans was 69.2 percent.
This disparity in black-white performance
continued into “second-generation” police department entrance examinations that made clear
attempts to improve the bearing of the questions
on police work. For example, approximately 20
to 25 percent of the questions on the 1970 New
York City Police Department (NYCPD) entrance examination asked applicants to supply
the appropriate behavioral response to a hypothetical situation supposed to typify the day-today experiences of a police officer.8 Yet this
exam excluded African Americans at almost the
same rate as the Memphis exam: 81.9 percent of
whites passed the 1970 exam, while 54.5 percent of African Americans did.9
6
Ashton v. City of Memphis, 49 F. Supp. 2d 1051, 1072
(W.D. Tenn., 1999).
7
Compare with the general evidence on the black-white
test score gap in Christopher Jencks and Meredith Phillips
(1998). To my knowledge, William Kephart (1957, 35) is
the first to relate black underrepresentation on police forces
to low average test scores. Speaking of Philadelphia, he
notes “under-representation seems to stem not from discriminatory personnel practices, but from the failure of large
numbers of Negroes to qualify on the civil service examinations.”
8
Guardian’s Association of the New York City Police
Department v. Civil Service Commission of the City of New
York, 431 F. Supp. 526, 543 (S.D. New York, 1977).
9
The Rand Corporation, in summarizing its study of the
1968 and 1970 NYCPD entrance examinations, concluded
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Despite the best attempts of police departments to design tests that would satisfy the new
legal regime in which they found themselves,
the 1970s federal judiciary frequently found
that use of these exams in police hiring was
discriminatory, sometimes even after departments had spent many years attempting to devise a valid test. In reaching these findings, the
courts relied on the notion of disparate impact,
a legal theory developed by jurists in the mid- to
late-1960s (Schlei and Grossman 1976). The
central tenet of disparate impact theory is that
an employment practice with no apparent racial
motivation may nonetheless be interpreted as
tentative evidence of discrimination if the employment practice disproportionately harms a
group protected under civil rights law, such as
African Americans or women. If a protected
class group member may demonstrate that an
employment practice leads to a disparate impact
for his or her group, then the employer is
obliged to demonstrate that the selection mechanism is predictive of job performance. The
Supreme Court sanctioned this theory in 1971
in Griggs v. Duke Power Company: “The
touchstone is business necessity. If an employment practice which operates to exclude Negroes cannot be shown to be related to job
performance, the practice is prohibited.”10
Disparate impact theory was largely developed in cases against private sector defendants
alleging violations of Title VII of the 1964 Civil
Rights Act (CRA) and the equal protection
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Although
coverage of Title VII would not be extended to
public employers until the 1972 amendments,
disparate impact theory arguments were put to
the courts between 1969 and 1971 alleging violations of the Fourteenth Amendment and the
Reconstruction Civil Rights Acts of 1866 and
1871 (Michael Reiss 1977). The courts were
receptive to these arguments, and in many cases
required police departments to hire according to
quotas by race, foreshadowing the remedies that
would result from Title VII litigation brought
after 1972. That the Reconstruction Civil Rights

that it was “confident that the patterns observed for [the
1970 exam] are not unique to that exam but are most likely
typical of the patterns for all recent civil service patrolmen’s
exams.” Quoted in 431 F. Supp. 526, 540.
10
401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971).
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Acts lay dormant for nearly a century before the
courts began to enforce them underscores the
idea that the federal judiciary may have played
at least as important a role as Congress in the
federal antidiscrimination effort. Historians
studying the evolution of civil rights policy
assign the courts a critical role, focusing on the
courts’ expansive interpretation of the 1964
CRA (e.g., Hugh Davis Graham 1990).
Cases alleging discrimination in police departments could be brought either by private
litigants or, after 1972, by the DOJ. DOJ
involvement was important not only because
of the high caliber of the government attorneys, but also because it placed in jeopardy
the revenue sharing funds distributed to police departments by the federal government.11
Nonetheless, while the DOJ was undoubtedly
an active player in the litigation, private litigants brought fully 80 percent of the class
action suits studied here. A common pattern is
for the local black police union to have brought
suit on behalf of members and potential members. Unlike the education cases studied by
Jonathan Guryan (2004) and Sarah Reber
(2003), the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) and
other national civil rights organizations were
essentially uninvolved in litigation against police departments.12
Following a judicial determination that a police department entrance examination disparately impacted African Americans, there was
typically a one- to three-year lag before any
quota would be imposed. During this period, the
judge would order the city to devise a test that
either did not exhibit disparate impact or was
job-related. If hiring was to proceed in the interim, temporary hiring quotas were sometimes
put in place until the new exam was adminis-

11

Crime Control Act of 1976, §122(c)(2)(E), 90 Stat.
2418 (1976). Based on my reading of police department
cases, I believe this penalty, while used as a threat in
conjunction with the Syracuse litigation, was used only
against the Chicago Police Department.
12
The NAACP participated in the Boston hiring litigation, the Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, hiring litigation, and the
Detroit promotion litigation; brought a series of suits against
smaller departments (several municipalities in New Jersey,
including Harrison; East Haven, Connecticut; Corinth, Mississippi; and Evergreen, Alabama); and was the lead organization behind the Alabama state troopers case (NAACP v.
Allen, 340 F. Supp. 703 (M.D. Ala., 1972)).
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tered. If the department proved unable to devise
a test that satisfied the court, the court often
imposed an ongoing quota.13,14
II. Litigation and the Integration of the Chicago
Police Department

Before turning to the main empirical analysis,
I first consider the case of Chicago, Illinois. The
hiring and promotion practices of the Chicago
Police Department (CPD) have been subjected
to litigation continuously from 1970 to 2000,
and the remedies from this litigation include
aggressive hiring quotas and the withholding of
some $100 million in revenue sharing funds.15 I
demonstrate the impact of litigation on CPD
hiring patterns using a unique administrative
dataset provided to me by the City of Chicago.
The dataset contains records on the race and
hiring and termination dates of a large sample of
police officers dating to the early 1960s.16
These data are superior to those collected by the
EEOC, because they can be used to calculate
the fraction African American among new hires
for many years prior and subsequent to litigation. In contrast, EEOC data contain only information on the overall black employment share.
The CPD was first required to justify its employment practices to a federal district court
judge in 1970, after the Afro-American Patrolmen’s League initiated suit. At that time,
Chicago employed a substantial number of
black officers, especially relative to other major
13
Ongoing quotas either expired by their terms (e.g., a
judge might require that 50 percent of new hires be African
American until 40 percent of the force was African American) or remained in operation until judicially withdrawn.
14
The departments under study lost approximately 80
percent of the cases brought against them from 1969 to
1980, and interim or ongoing quotas were imposed in over
90 percent of the cases they lost in these same years. Cases
brought in the 1980s and 1990s were less numerous, targeted small police departments, and were less likely to
result in affirmative action requirements. Police departments litigated after 1980 won approximately 65 percent of
the cases brought against them, and only 43 percent of the
cases departments lost resulted in a hiring quota. These
figures are measured with a high degree of noise due to
difficulties with unpublished decisions (see Appendix I),
which motivates the paper’s focus on the reduced form
effect of litigation.
15
See, for example, the discussion of the litigation in
U.S. v. City of Chicago, 411 F. Supp. 218, 225–245 (N.D.
Ill. 1976).
16
See Appendix I for details.
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cities.17 Figure 1 gives the black employment
and black hiring share in the CPD from 1960 to
1997. The black employment share in the 1960s
and early 1970s was roughly 18 percent. For
comparison, 23 percent of Chicago residents in
1960 were African Americans, and 33 percent
were African Americans in 1970. The DOJ
joined the suit against the CPD in 1973, and in
1974 an interim hiring quota on behalf of African Americans was imposed, followed by an
ongoing hiring quota in 1976. Figure 1 demonstrates that there was substantial compliance
with the court’s orders. In the years 1971 to
1973, the hiring share was roughly 10 percent.
By 1975 it had climbed to 40 percent, and
throughout the 1975–1990 period, the hiring
share averaged 32 percent. Although the demographic composition of new hires to the CPD
responded dramatically to the hiring quota, the
demographic composition of the police force
changed only slowly, because of low quit rates.
Using these data, I estimate an annual quit rate
of 3.6 percent, which is within the range of the
available estimates for other police departments
in varying time periods.18 Considering the low
police department quit rates, we should not expect court orders to lead to dramatic changes in
black employment share. Instead, we would
expect these to lead to a trend break in black
employment share after the filing date of
litigation.
For cities other than Chicago, high-quality
data on black hiring share are not available.
However, I have collected data on black employment share for a large sample of police
departments. If quit rates are stable over time, as
they appear to be for police departments, it is
possible to approximate the gain in the hiring
share African American using data on the gain
in the black employment share; I next describe
a simple methodology for doing so. Appendix II
develops the approximation
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a convex factor to be defined. The approximation is an identity if the quit rates for black and
all officers are equal, and if hiring rates, the
hiring fraction African American, and quit rates
are constant over the period t ⫺ k to t. Those
conditions imply that ␣ ⫽ ((1 ⫺ q )/(1 ⫹  ))k,
where q denotes the quit rate, and  denotes the
year-over-year police force growth rate.19 Suppose the approximation is valid and contemplate a restated version of (1):
(2)

f ⫺ F t ⫺ k ⬇

1
共F ⫺ F t ⫺ k 兲.
1⫺␣ t

where Ft is the black employment share in period t, f is the average hiring fraction African
American during the period t ⫺ k to t, and ␣ is

A simple way to think of (2) is as follows.
Suppose that in period t ⫺ k a police department
is in a steady state, such that the hiring fraction
African American is equal to the overall police
department black employment share (i.e.,
ft ⫺ k ⫽ Ft ⫺ k, where ft ⫺ k is the hiring fraction
African American in period t ⫺ k). Litigation
occurs, and an affirmative action program is
imposed on the police department, resulting in
an increase in the hiring share African American. After k periods, the police department
black employment share is observed to have
increased by Ft ⫺ Ft ⫺ k. Then, with an estimate
of the quit rate q and the year-over-year growth
rate  , we compute ␣ ⫽ ((1 ⫺ q )/(1 ⫹  ))k and
inflate the gain Ft ⫺ Ft ⫺ k by the factor 1/(1 ⫺
␣); the approximation in (2) justifies an interpretation of this quantity as the gain in the
hiring share African American over the initial
hiring share African American (i.e., f ⫺ ft ⫺ k).
To make these ideas concrete, consider Figure 1, where it is clear that the average hiring
fraction African American from 1974 to 1997
far exceeded the historical hiring fraction African American. Using the 0.088 gain in the black
employment share from 1974 to 1997, we can
use the approximation in (2) to estimate the gain
in the hiring fraction African American. Using a
3.6-percent quit rate and the observed annual
growth rate of the police force of 0.06 percent,
the estimated gain in the hiring fraction African
American is 0.088/(1 ⫺ ((1 ⫺ 0.036)/(1 ⫹
0.0006))1997 ⫺ 1974) ⬟ 0.153. Unlike the data
analyzed in the main body of the paper, the

17
The CPD employed substantial numbers of black officers even as of 1940 (Arthur Raper 1940).
18
See Appendix II. Quit rates appear to vary somewhere
between 3 and 5 percent.

19
As discussed in Appendix II, the approximation remains accurate if quit rates and hiring rates are small and
satisfy a law of large numbers and if black quit rates are
approximately equal to overall quit rates.

(1)

F t ⬇ ␣ F t ⫺ k ⫹ 共1 ⫺ ␣ 兲f,
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FIGURE 1. THE CHICAGO EXPERIENCE
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administrative data from Chicago allow us to
calculate the hiring share African American directly. Thus, we may assess the quality of the
approximation by simply calculating the hiring
share African American over the period 1974 to
1997 and comparing it to the prediction based
on the approximation in (2). The actual gain in
the hiring share African American in these data
is 0.161, which is roughly comparable to the
prediction of 0.153 given above.
There is some discrepancy, however. The
prediction based on the approximation in (2)
will be understated (overstated) if the quit rate is
overstated (understated). For example, a quit
rate of 3.3 percent rationalizes the prediction
and the actual, and a quit rate of 4 percent leads
to a prediction of 0.144, which is too small. As
shown in Appendix II, the prediction will also
be understated if the black quit rate exceeds the
overall quit rate. This is an important consideration. There is a large body of evidence indicating that in departments subject to federal
court oversight on account of litigation, white
officers harassed black officers with the apparent goal of inducing a high black quit rate.20 If
the black quit rate exceeds the overall quit rate,
then the true gain in the black hiring share is at
least as large as implied by (2). On the other
hand, it is possible that the black quit rate is less
than the overall quit rate, given the clear incentives created by public sector wage schedules
and the private sector black-white wage gap.21
On balance, the approximation probably yields
predictions that are in the right ballpark, but
care should be exercised in interpretation.
Did the federal court’s aggressive intervention into CPD hiring practices affect police per20

For example, “in a welcoming speech given to at least
one academy class, a Captain reminded the cadets that while
the Division of Police was forced to accept blacks and
females, they did not have to keep them” (Police Officers
for Equal Rights v. City of Columbus, 644 F. Supp. 393, 401
(S.D. Ohio, 1985)). For further examples, see for instance
U.S. v. City of Buffalo, 457 F. Supp. 612, 632 (W.D. New
York, 1978); Ways v. City of Lincoln, 871 F. 2d 750, 753
(8th Cir., 1989); Busby v. City of Orlando, 931 F. 2d 764,
781 (11th Cir., 1991); and Phillips v. Heydt, 197 F. Supp. 2d
207 (E.D. Pa., 2002).
21
See William J. Carrington, Kristin McCue, and
Brooks Pierce (1996) and Joseph Altonji and Rebecca
Blank (1999). An analogous context is blacks in the military, where in 1978 the black quit rate was lower than the
overall quit rate; see Baker v. City of Detroit, 483 F. Supp.
930, fn. 58 (D.C. Mich., 1979).
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formance measures? Panel B of Figure 1 shows
the size of the work force (solid line, solid
squares), the scope of crime in Chicago (solid
line, open triangles), and two measures of arrests per crime (dotted lines). The figure shows
that police per capita has remained nearly constant over the entire period. Crime per capita
does appear to increase slightly in the same year
as the quota imposition. It is also apparent,
however, that crime is a volatile series—the
increase does not appear unusual, compared to
other year-over-year changes in the series. Arrests per crime are measured by (a) the number
of index crimes cleared, normalized by the
number of crimes (solid squares), and (b) the
number of index crime arrests, normalized by
the number of crimes (open triangles). The first
of these measures is on the same data file as the
number of crimes. The second of these measures is available in a greater number of years,
but is taken from two separate data files and
hence is presumably measured with more error
than the first. The two series are both rather
noisy, and it is not immediately clear whether
there are any productivity effects.
Panel C of Figure 1 gives the fraction African
American for arrests for all index crime arrests
and for all arrests. The city fraction black is
provided for comparison. These series are noisy
as well and fail to reveal any clear pattern
around either the litigation filing date or the date
of quota imposition.
Perhaps the strongest conclusion implied by
the police performance measures in panels B
and C is that detecting productivity effects will
require a statistically powerful approach, such
as that pursued below. The focus on a large
number of cities should help to eliminate much
of the noise in the available performance measures through averaging, enabling us to detect
the productivity effects of affirmative action.
III. Litigation and the Composition of Police

In this section of the paper, I first consider
comparisons between litigated and unlitigated
departments over time. Second, I consider estimators that take advantage of the timing of
litigation. Third, I discuss threats to the internal
validity of the estimates presented in the second
subsection. Finally, I present a direct test of
litigation threat effects (cf. Sherwin Rosen
1969), or the hypothesized tendency of unliti-
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gated departments to integrate in order to avoid
litigation.
A. Contrasting the Litigated and the
Unlitigated
Litigated cities are far from a representative
sample of the 314 cities under study.22 Table 1
presents means and standard deviations of key
variables by litigation status for two samples: the
“full sample” (all 314 cities) and the “long sample” (120 cities with information on black employment share dating to 1960). For cities in the
full sample, estimates on black employment share
are not necessarily available before 1969. All statistics in the table, and throughout the paper, are
weighted by 1970 city population unless otherwise noted.
The table indicates that although only 30
percent of all cities are ever litigated, residents
of litigated cities comprise nearly 58 percent of
the 60 million residents in 1960, and 50 percent
of the 75 million residents in 1999. While generally much of the federal antidiscrimination
effort was focused on the South, that pattern is
not true of the cases studied here. Among litigated cities, 23 percent of the population lives
in the South, and 11 percent in the Deep South;
among unlitigated cities, these statistics are 33
and 13 percent, respectively. Figure 2 is a map
of the contiguous United States, with unlitigated
cities represented as circles in the top panel and
litigated cities represented as stars in the bottom
panel. It is clear from the map that litigation was
not confined to any particular region.
In substantive terms, the most important difference between litigated and unlitigated cities
regards the city fraction African American.23
Throughout the sample period, 1960 to 1999,
22
See Appendix I for details on the selection of cities for
study.
23
Litigated departments are more likely to have experienced a riot. Of the cities analyzed here, 300 (90 litigated
cities) were also analyzed by Seymour Spilerman (1970). I
estimate that experiencing a riot in any of the years 1961 to
1968 increases the probability of litigation by roughly 40
percentage points (separate regressions for each year) and
decreases the year of litigation by 3 years. Unlike the
estimates on the impact of litigation below, these correlations reflect differences in city size; for example, controlling
additionally for the log of city population leads to insignificant results for all but 2 of the 16 coefficients described. In
these regressions, the 2 significant coefficients suggest that
a riot in 1962 or 1965 delayed litigation by just over 4 years.
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litigated cities had larger African American
populations than did unlitigated cities. In 1960,
12 percent of the residents of unlitigated cities
were African Americans, but 18 percent of the
residents of litigated cities were. This 6-point
difference grew to a 10-point difference in 1970
and an 11-point difference in 1980 before stabilizing.
Police department black employment share
did not initially keep up with these sharp gains.
In 1970, litigated departments employed only 7
percent black officers. Between 1970 and 1980,
black employment and population shares increased by equal amounts, and between 1980
and 1990, and again between 1990 and 1999,
black employment share grew by more than the
city fraction African American. Consequently,
from 1970 to 1999, the difference between
black employment and population shares, or the
representation gap, in litigated departments converged from ⫺0.17 to ⫺0.09. In contrast, the
representation gap among unlitigated departments remained roughly constant at ⫺0.10 in
1970 and 1980, and ⫺0.09 in 1990 and 1999.
To economize on space, the estimates in Table 1 are given only at ten-year intervals. For all
years for which estimates are available, Figure 3
gives the time series graph of the representation
gap separately for litigated and unlitigated departments. The top panel gives estimates for the
full sample, beginning with 1969. Several aspects of the graph are of note. First, unlitigated
departments experience almost no convergence
until around 1985. From 1985 to 1993 there is
convergence of about 0.015, followed by a
slight widening in the mid- to late-1990s. Second, starting some time near 1977, litigated
departments’ representation gap converges to
that of unlitigated departments. The convergence is very nearly linear in time starting
around 1980.
Taking the numbers in Table 1 and Figure 3 at
face value, a simple difference-in-differences
estimate of the long-run impact of litigation on
the representation gap is about 0.07. This estimate could understate or overstate the impact of
litigation. For example, the estimate may be too
small if there are important threat effects to
litigation, since then part of unlitigated departments’ convergence in representation gap would
reflect the effect of litigation. The estimate
may also be too small if there is heterogeneity
in the timing of litigation, since late-litigated
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Full sample
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Long sample

All
Litigated Unlitigated
All
Litigated Unlitigated
Year (n ⫽ 314) (n ⫽ 92) (n ⫽ 222) Difference (n ⫽ 120) (n ⫽ 43) (n ⫽ 77) Difference
A. City characteristics
Fraction South1
Fraction Deep
South2
City population3 in
hundred
thousands
Fraction African
American

NA
NA
1960
1999
1960
1970
1980
1990
1999

B. Police department
characteristics
Log sworn police per
100,000
population
African American
employment
share

1960
1999
1960
1970
1980
1990
1999

C. City crime rate
Log UCR index
crimes per
100,000
population

1960
1970
1980
1990
1999

0.28
[0.45]
0.12
[0.32]
1.9
[5.3]
2.4
[5.5]
0.16
[0.11]
0.20
[0.13]
0.24
[0.17]
0.26
[0.18]
0.28
[0.19]

0.23
[0.42]
0.11
[0.31]
3.8
[9.2]
4.1
[9.6]
0.18
[0.10]
0.24
[0.11]
0.29
[0.14]
0.31
[0.15]
0.32
[0.16]

0.33
[0.47]
0.13
[0.33]
1.1
[1.5]
1.7
[1.8]
0.12
[0.12]
0.14
[0.14]
0.18
[0.18]
0.20
[0.20]
0.22
[0.21]

⫺0.10
(0.05)
⫺0.02
(0.04)
2.7
(0.6)
2.4
(0.7)
0.07
(0.01)
0.10
(0.01)
0.11
(0.02)
0.11
(0.02)
0.11
(0.02)

0.36
[0.48]
0.15
[0.35]
2.5
[7.9]
3.2
[7.9]
0.19
[0.11]
0.23
[0.13]
0.28
[0.17]
0.30
[0.18]
0.31
[0.19]

0.28
[0.45]
0.12
[0.32]
4.9
[12.5]
5.2
[12.5]
0.19
[0.09]
0.26
[0.11]
0.31
[0.13]
0.33
[0.13]
0.33
[0.14]

0.52
[0.50]
0.20
[0.40]
1.2
[2.2]
2.1
[2.3]
0.17
[0.14]
0.18
[0.16]
0.23
[0.21]
0.26
[0.24]
0.28
[0.26]

⫺0.24
(0.09)
⫺0.09
(0.07)
3.7
(1.5)
3.2
(1.5)
0.02
(0.02)
0.07
(0.02)
0.08
(0.03)
0.07
(0.03)
0.05
(0.04)

5.2
[0.4]
5.6
[0.4]
NA

5.3
[0.4]
5.8
[0.4]
NA

5.0
[0.3]
5.4
[0.3]
NA

0.35
(0.04)
0.46
(0.04)
NA

0.06
[0.05]
0.10
[0.08]
0.15
[0.12]
0.18
[0.14]

0.07
[0.05]
0.12
[0.06]
0.18
[0.09]
0.23
[0.12]

0.05
[0.06]
0.08
[0.09]
0.11
[0.13]
0.13
[0.15]

0.02
(0.01)
0.04
(0.01)
0.07
(0.01)
0.10
(0.02)

5.3
[0.4]
5.8
[0.4]
0.05
[0.04]
0.07
[0.05]
0.12
[0.09]
0.17
[0.12]
0.21
[0.15]

5.4
[0.4]
5.9
[0.4]
0.05
[0.04]
0.07
[0.05]
0.12
[0.07]
0.19
[0.10]
0.23
[0.11]

5.0
[0.4]
5.5
[0.4]
0.03
[0.03]
0.06
[0.05]
0.11
[0.12]
0.15
[0.16]
0.17
[0.19]

0.38
(0.07)
0.48
(0.07)
0.02
(0.01)
0.02
(0.01)
0.02
(0.02)
0.03
(0.02)
0.06
(0.03)

7.9
[0.4]
8.7
[0.3]
9.1
[0.3]
9.3
[0.3]
8.9
[0.5]

7.8
[0.4]
8.8
[0.3]
9.1
[0.3]
9.3
[0.3]
8.8
[0.5]

7.9
[0.5]
8.7
[0.4]
9.1
[0.3]
9.2
[0.3]
9.0
[0.5]

⫺0.13
(0.05)
0.05
(0.04)
0.00
(0.03)
0.05
(0.04)
⫺0.11
(0.05)

7.9
[0.4]
8.8
[0.3]
9.2
[0.3]
9.3
[0.3]
8.8
[0.5]

7.8
[0.3]
8.8
[0.2]
9.2
[0.2]
9.3
[0.3]
8.7
[0.5]

8.0
[0.5]
8.7
[0.4]
9.2
[0.3]
9.3
[0.3]
9.0
[0.6]

⫺0.21
(0.07)
0.09
(0.06)
0.01
(0.05)
0.01
(0.06)
⫺0.26
(0.10)

Notes: Standard deviations in brackets; standard errors in parentheses. Unless otherwise noted, all statistics are weighted by
1970 city population.
1
South as defined by the Census Bureau.
2
Deep South is defined as Alabama, Mississippi, Louisiana, Arkansas, Tennessee, Georgia, South Carolina, North
Carolina, and Virginia.
3
Equally weighted.
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FIGURE 2. MAP

OF

CITIES

departments do not have as many years as earlylitigated departments to experience gains in
black employment. These two considerations
are addressed empirically in Sections IIID and
IIIB, respectively.
On the other hand, a difference-in-differences
estimate may be too large. First, convergence in
the representation gap may simply reflect preexisting trends. Second, litigation may be associated with broader social trends which would
have led to integration, even were litigation
never to have occurred—the “social change”
hypothesis of Donohue and Heckman (1991,
1605). I next discuss these two hypotheses in
somewhat more detail.
Direct evidence regarding the preexisting
trends hypothesis may be obtained from the
long sample of cities, for which information on
black employment share predates 1969. Information on these departments is included in the
final three columns of Table 1. The estimates in
Table 1 suggest that black employment share in

BY

MARCH 2007

LITIGATION STATUS

1960 was neither zero, nor yet as high as it
would be in 1970. Interestingly, the 1960 to
1970 increase in black employment share is
larger for unlitigated cities than for litigated
cities, despite the fact that the black population
share in unlitigated cities rose only marginally
from 0.17 to 0.18, while that in litigated cities
rose from 0.19 to 0.26.
The bottom panel of Figure 3 presents the
time series plot of the representation gap for
departments in the long sample. The figure speaks
against a preexisting trends hypothesis—the representation gap worsened substantially in litigated
departments between 1960 and 1970. During the
decade of litigation, 1970 to 1980, the representation gap slowed its negative slide. By the end of
the decade, the gap was closing. Unlitigated departments, in contrast, appear to have exhibited a
slowly improving representation gap from 1960 to
1999, with some acceleration near 1985. In short,
the figure is not consistent with an important role
for preexisting trends. Indeed, the evidence is

VOL. 97 NO. 1

MCCRARY: COURT-ORDERED HIRING QUOTAS

329

-0.08

Representation Gap

-0.10
-0.12
-0.14
-0.16
-0.18
-0.20
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1970

1975
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Year
Litigated (n=92)

Unlitigated (n=222)

A. Full Sample

Representation Gap

-0.08
-0.10
-0.12
-0.14
-0.16
-0.18
-0.20
1960

1965

1970

1975

1980

1985

1990

1995

Year
Litigated (n=43)

Unlitigated (n=77)

B. Long Sample
FIGURE 3. REPRESENTATION GAP

BY

LITIGATION STATUS

Note: Figure gives time series of the difference between police department black employment
share and city fraction African American (“representation gap”), separately by litigation
status, for two samples. See text for details.

consistent with the proposition that litigation reversed preexisting trends, a proposition strengthened by the evidence from event study estimates
shown below.
To be more specific regarding the type of
mechanism underlying a social change hypothesis, suppose that the 1970s saw both a decade
of class action lawsuits against municipal police
departments and the beginning of a new, national hiring regime in which the fraction Afri-

can American among new hires was only a little
below the city fraction African American.24 In

24
An alternative version of the social change hypothesis
asserts that a case is more likely to be filed when there is
general political pressure to integrate the police department.
Two considerations suggest that this is not an important
threat to validity. First, the estimates below are strengthened
rather than weakened when unrestricted state-by-year
controls are included. Since social change is likely to be
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such a state of the world, it would mechanically
be true that cities with low representation gaps
would experience the greatest gains. This concern is addressed empirically in Section IIIC,
below, using propensity score reweighting techniques (Paul R. Rosenbaum and Donald B. Rubin 1983).
The prelitigation estimates in Table 1 and in
Figure 3 suggest that litigation was targeted at
big cities in which the police department black
employment share did not initially rise as quickly
as the city fraction African American. Economically, a pattern of targeted enforcement is notable
for two reasons. First, it suggests that it may
have been possible for a department to forestall
a class action employment discrimination suit
by hiring more black officers. This does not
establish that threat effects contributed to the
observed gains in black employment share in
unlitigated cities. It does mean, however, that
such a story is not entirely implausible. Second,
targeted enforcement is notable because previous research has failed to find evidence of targeting in the federal contractor program.
Leonard (1985, 372) characterizes the compliance review program as a “random enforcement
process,” consistent with the earlier conclusions
of Heckman and Kenneth Wolpin (1976).25
B. The Timing of Litigation
Having considered comparisons between litigated and unlitigated departments, I now turn
to an examination of the timing of litigation.
This identification strategy is feasible only to
the extent that different departments are litigated at different times. Figure 4, which gives
the histogram of litigation filing dates of the

similar for two cities in the same state, this pattern speaks
against this specific version of a social change hypothesis. Second, the cases studied here only rarely involve
civil rights groups (which would be expected to be
heavily involved if litigation merely reflected a broader
social movement).
25
In comparing the enforcement process of the CRA and
the federal contractor program, it is economically interesting to note that judicial enforcement of the CRA is highly
decentralized, with the decision to litigate largely in the
hands of individuals who feel they have been discriminated
against. When the CRA was initially passed, civil rights
advocates took a dim view of decentralized enforcement,
preferring an Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
with cease-and-desist authority (Rose 1989, 1133–34).
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cases under study, demonstrates that there is
quite a bit of heterogeneity in terms of the
timing of the cases brought against police departments.
Importantly, while the cross-sectional differences between litigated and unlitigated cities in
confounders are often quite substantial, the differences among litigated cities litigated at different times are more minor. Table 2 gives
weighted means and standard deviations of key
variables for five different ranges of filing dates.
Regional composition varies by the timing of
litigation. However, key confounders such as
city fraction African American are quite comparable across at least the first three filing date
ranges.26
The estimates I present next correspond to
least squares estimates of j in the regression
model

冘D
b

(3)

Y i,t ⫽  i ⫹  r共i兲,t ⫹

j

j
i,t

⫹ e i,t ,

j⫽a

where Yi,t denotes the representation gap in department i at time t and Dji,t are leads and lags of
litigation filing dates, defined as

再

D i 1(t ⱕ i ⫹ a) for j ⫽ a
j
(4) D i,t
⫽ Di1(t ⫽ i ⫹ j) for a ⬍ j ⬍ b ,
Di1(t ⱖ i ⫹ b) for j ⫽ b
where Di is an indicator for whether the department was ever the defendant in a class action
employment discrimination lawsuit alleging
discrimination against African Americans in
hiring, i gives the filing date for litigated departments, and 1( A) is one if A is true but is
otherwise zero.27 Because not all parameters are
identified as written, normalize 0 ⫽ 0. The
sequence j then admits the interpretation of the
26
The fourth filing date range is also somewhat close to
the others in terms of many characteristics, but the fifth
filing date range is more similar to the unlitigated cities than
to any of the litigated cities. In a weighted regression,
however, the contrasts will be focused between the first four
filing date ranges because of their much greater size.
27
This specification is similar in spirit to that used by
Jacobson, Lalonde, and Sullivan (1993). For departments
not having judicial interventions, the filing dates are irrelevant so define them to be zero. It is understood that a ⬍ 0.
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Number of Cities Litigated
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10
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9
8
7
6
5
4
3
2
1
0
1969
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1984
Year

B. Weighted by 1970 City Population
FIGURE 4. HISTOGRAMS

representation gap difference from filing date to
j periods thereafter.28 I refer to the parameter
sequence i as “city effects” and to r(i),t as
“region-by-year effects.” The empirical work
uses “regions” of the four census regions, the

28
This is a different normalization than that employed
by Jacobson, Lalonde, and Sullivan (1993). Because their
outcome variable (earnings) was available far before the
first treatment date, the omitted category was earnings from
long before the treatment. This strategy is not feasible here;
the first treatment date (1969) is also the first year for which
data on African American employment share in police departments are available for the full sample.

OF

LITIGATION FILING DATES

nine census divisions, and U.S. states, and also
considers the restriction that the region-by-year
effects are cross-sectionally constant (r(i),t ⫽
t). Both the city effects and the region-by-year
effects are nuisance parameters and are to be
estimated by fixed effects.
It is important to note that, moving from left
to right in the event study graph, the sample of
cities driving the identification of j is generally
subject to change. For example, only earlylitigated cities can drive the estimated impacts
of 20 years after litigation, since late-litigated
cities will not yet have been observed 20 years
after they were litigated. For this reason, I as-
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AND

STANDARD DEVIATIONS

Year
A. City characteristics
Fraction South
Fraction Deep South
City population in hundred thousands

NA
NA
1960
1999

Fraction African American

1960
1970
1980
1990
1999

B. Police department characteristics
Log sworn police per 100,000 population

1960
1999

African American employment share

1960
1970
1980
1990
1999

C. City crime rate
Log UCR index crimes per 100,000 population

1960
1970
1980
1990
1999

OF

KEY VARIABLES

Litigated
1969–71
(n ⫽ 19)

MARCH 2007
BY

LITIGATION TIMING

Litigated
1972–73
(n ⫽ 17)

Litigated
1974–76
(n ⫽ 18)

Litigated
1977–80
(n ⫽ 18)

Litigated
1981–2000
(n ⫽ 20)

0.07
0.03
4.4
[8.8]
4.0
[7.0]
0.20
[0.09]
0.27
[0.11]
0.32
[0.13]
0.33
[0.12]
0.33
[0.12]

0.24
0.10
8.5
[18.1]
8.5
[18.8]
0.19
[0.09]
0.27
[0.11]
0.32
[0.13]
0.35
[0.13]
0.36
[0.14]

0.50
0.25
3.1
[2.4]
3.7
[3.6]
0.21
[0.12]
0.23
[0.11]
0.29
[0.13]
0.32
[0.15]
0.36
[0.18]

0.15
0.12
2.7
[5.6]
3.4
[8.4]
0.15
[0.08]
0.19
[0.07]
0.20
[0.09]
0.20
[0.11]
0.21
[0.14]

0.23
0.06
0.9
[0.5]
1.2
[0.5]
0.08
[0.10]
0.12
[0.13]
0.15
[0.16]
0.16
[0.17]
0.19
[0.18]

5.6
[0.2]
6.0
[0.3]
0.081
[0.05]
0.12
[0.07]
0.16
[0.06]
0.21
[0.07]
0.26
[0.09]

5.5
[0.4]
6.0
[0.3]
0.041
[0.01]
0.06
[0.03]
0.12
[0.06]
0.19
[0.10]
0.25
[0.11]

5.1
[0.3]
5.5
[0.2]
0.041
[0.04]
0.05
[0.03]
0.10
[0.05]
0.19
[0.10]
0.24
[0.15]

5.1
[0.2]
5.6
[0.2]
NA

4.9
[0.4]
5.4
[0.4]
NA

0.04
[0.02]
0.09
[0.03]
0.15
[0.05]
0.16
[0.06]

0.04
[0.05]
0.05
[0.05]
0.08
[0.08]
0.09
[0.08]

7.8
[0.3]
8.6
[0.4]
9.0
[0.3]
9.3
[0.4]
9.0
[0.3]

7.8
[0.2]
8.9
[0.2]
9.2
[0.1]
9.3
[0.2]
8.7
[0.5]

7.8
[0.2]
8.7
[0.2]
9.1
[0.3]
9.3
[0.4]
9.1
[0.3]

8.1
[0.5]
8.8
[0.2]
9.2
[0.2]
9.2
[0.2]
8.8
[0.3]

7.8
[0.5]
8.6
[0.5]
9.1
[0.5]
9.2
[0.5]
8.8
[0.6]

Notes: Standard deviations in brackets. Estimates presented are based on the full sample only, unless otherwise noted.
1
Estimates for 1969 –1971, 1972–1973, and 1974 –1976 taken from the 11, 9, and 8 respective cities in the long sample
with litigation dates in the given categories. Estimates for other litigation date ranges omitted because long sample cities do
not appear to be representative.

sign more weight to prelitigation estimates obtained from the long sample—for many cities,
the first period of information on black employment share is 1969, which coincides with the
onset of litigation.

These composition bias effects may be compounded by irregular observation of the outcome variable, coupled with heterogeneous
treatment effects. An example will serve to illustrate. Because data on police department
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black employment share are available only at
periodic intervals29 a city such as Oakland, California, which is litigated in 1969, is observed at
litigation lags 0, 4, 5, 6, 8, and so on. A city
such as Chicago, which is litigated in 1970, is
instead observed at litigation lags ⫺1, 3, 4, 5, 7,
and so on.30 In other words, in the absence of a
corrective procedure, litigation effects will be
estimated over partially nonoverlapping subsamples. Continuing the example, if Chicago
and Oakland exhibit different gains in representation gap following litigation, then the event
study graph will oscillate about the average
effect of the two.
A natural method to correct for the composition bias is to interpolate linearly between observation years, taking care to correct the
standard errors for both the induced serial correlation and degrees of freedom. This procedure
seems particularly plausible in the present context, because of the low quit rate of police
officers (see equation (1)). Practically, the procedure amounts to using clustered standard errors at the level of city, inflated manually by a
degrees-of-freedom correction to reflect that
many observations are imputed.
The top panel of Figure 5 gives estimates of
four specifications of equation (3) based on the
full sample. The thick solid line gives estimates
from a year effects specification, the thin dashed
line gives estimates from a region-by-year effects specification, the thick line with circles
gives estimates from a division-by-year specification, and the dashed line with triangles gives
estimates from a state-by-year specification. Although the four specifications give estimates
that are rather different in their magnitude, the
direction of the estimated effects is quite similar. In the first decade after litigation, black
employment share begins to converge toward
the city fraction African American. In the second and third decades, the improvement becomes marked.
The convex shape of the event study graph is
expected for two reasons. First, a cursory reading of the decisions in these cases indicates that
29
For example, black employment share for cities in the
full sample is observed only in 1969, 1973, 1974, 1975,
1977, 1980, and so on.
30
The litigation lags listed assume use only of the full
sample dataset. Estimates for the 1960s are also available for
both Oakland and Chicago, as both are in the long sample.
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judges were more inclined to intervene aggressively into police department hiring practices in
the early years of the litigation. Litigation effects at the longest lags reflect primarily the
experience of the earliest litigated. Second,
there is heterogeneity in how long after the
filing date the judge would wait before imposing an affirmative action remedy. Some departments would almost immediately be required to
hire according to a quota regime, whereas other
departments would be given some time to devise a new test.
The prelitigation estimates for the full sample
are based on less reliable information than those
for the long sample. Estimates for the long
sample are given in the bottom panel of Figure
5. The estimates for the long sample strongly
suggest that litigation was not preceded by representation gap convergence. In the decade
prior to litigation, the representation gap appears to have been constant, or perhaps even
growing. The postlitigation estimates are not
identical to those of the top panel, but are similar in magnitude. An important difference between the estimates in the top and bottom panels
is that the four specifications in the long sample
give estimates that are more widely varying
than those in the full sample. For example,
while the region-by-year effects models are
similar in the long and full samples, the stateby-year effects models are much larger in the
long sample. Conversely, the year effects models are much smaller in the long sample than in
the full.
Because of the near linearity of the estimate
sequences graphed in Figure 5, it is natural to
pool the individual estimates to estimate the
postlitigation and prelitigation slopes. The top
panel of Table 3 presents a variety of estimates
of the postlitigation slope for the full sample.
Following the pattern of the specifications in
Figure 5, Model 1 includes year effects only,
Model 2 region-by-year effects, Model 3 divisionby-year effects, and Model 4 state-by-year effects. The first four columns are the estimates
for all 314 cities in the full sample. For these
cities, the estimated slope is in the range 0.07 to
0.12, with a standard error of about 0.02.31

31
As noted above, the reported standard errors here and
throughout the paper are “clustered” at the level of the city
and inflated by a degrees of freedom correction. More
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FIGURE 5. EVENT STUDY ESTIMATES OF THE IMPACT OF LITIGATION ON THE REPRESENTATION GAP

Columns 5 to 8 exclude all unlitigated cities
from the estimation. The litigation effects for
these models, then, are based purely off of the
timing of the litigation among the litigated. This

has some appeal: one might view with some
caution estimates that rely on using the unlitigated as a model of the counterfactual evolution
of the representation gap among the litigated,

specifically, they are the square root of the diagonals of the
n
n
n
n
matrix (nT/¥i⫽1
Ti)(¥i⫽1
X⬘i Xiwi)⫺1(¥i⫽1
X⬘iêiê⬘i Xiwi)(¥i⫽1
X⬘i Xiwi)⫺1, where T is the number of possible time-series
observations, Ti is the number of time-series observations
for city i with (unimputed) information on black employment share, wi is 1970 city population, normalized to sum to
1, Xi is the T ⫻ K matrix of time-series observations for city

i, and êi is the T-vector of fitted residuals for city i. Because
there are a moderate to large number of cities in all specifications in Table 3, conventional t-ratio tests using these
standard errors will exhibit approximately correct size regardless of the form of the heteroskedasticity and serial
correlation within each city, provided that the residuals
across cities are independent. (The only potential exception
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TABLE 3—PARAMETRIC ESTIMATES

OF THE IMPACT OF

LITIGATION

ON THE
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REPRESENTATION GAP

A. Full sample estimates
All 314 cities

25 ⴱ Postlitigation trend

92 litigated cities only

Model 1

Model 2

Model 3

Model 4

Model 1

Model 2

Model 3

Model 4

(1)
0.060
(0.031)

(2)
0.096
(0.022)

(3)
0.097
(0.024)

(4)
0.121
(0.018)

(5)
0.057
(0.066)

(6)
0.107
(0.046)

(7)
0.107
(0.045)

(8)
0.154
(0.032)

255 cities identifying Model 4

25 ⴱ Postlitigation trend

Reweighting the unlitigated

Model 1

Model 2

Model 3

Model 4

Model 1

Model 2

Model 3

Model 4

(9)
0.055
(0.033)

(10)
0.101
(0.026)

(11)
0.101
(0.027)

(12)
0.121
(0.018)

(13)
0.033
(0.032)

(14)
0.073
(0.028)

(15)
0.072
(0.032)

(16)
0.113
(0.022)

Model 1

Model 2

Model 3

Model 4

Model 1

Model 2

Model 3

Model 4

(17)
0.048
(0.046)
0.123
(0.059)

(18)
0.097
(0.042)
0.179
(0.061)

(19)
0.102
(0.047)
0.175
(0.060)

(20)
0.162
(0.025)
0.283
(0.045)

(21)
0.049
(0.062)
0.041
(0.091)

(22)
0.106
(0.052)
0.162
(0.055)

(23)
0.108
(0.054)
0.158
(0.056)

(24)
0.158
(0.035)
0.278
(0.040)

B. Long sample estimates
All 120 cities

25 ⴱ Postlitigation trend
25 ⴱ Post-pretrend difference

43 litigated cities only

86 cities identifying Model 4

25 ⴱ Postlitigation trend
25 ⴱ Post-pretrend difference

Reweighting the unlitigated

Model 1

Model 2

Model 3

Model 4

Model 1

Model 2

Model 3

Model 4

(25)
0.100
(0.071)
0.172
(0.107)

(26)
0.121
(0.056)
0.199
(0.070)

(27)
0.118
(0.057)
0.189
(0.068)

(28)
0.162
(0.025)
0.283
(0.034)

(29)
0.036
(0.046)
0.134
(0.069)

(30)
0.094
(0.041)
0.183
(0.067)

(31)
0.095
(0.046)
0.173
(0.063)

(32)
0.156
(0.032)
0.289
(0.041)

Notes: Standard errors, clustered at the level of the city and adjusted for degrees of freedom, presented in parentheses. Panel
A presents estimates of the annual gain (times 25) in representation gap in the years following litigation for four choices of
specification, three subsets of the full sample, and two different weighting schemes. The four specifications correspond to
those from Figure 5: year effects only, region-by-year effects, division-by-year effects, and state-by-year effects. Estimates
in columns 13 to 16 are weighted by a factor that approximately equalizes in distribution the 1969 representation gap for
litigated and unlitigated cities (see text for details). Panel B is organized identically, but is based on the 120 cities in the long
sample. Panel B additionally reports the difference in postlitigation and prelitigation annual gains in representation gap.

had they in fact never been litigated. Nevertheless, caution is warranted in interpreting these
estimates. Identification leans on a and b, the
endpoints of the event study graph, which are
usually thought of as nuisance parameters. To
see the role played by a and b in identification,
suppose that we were to estimate the pre- and
postlitigation slopes in one step, by regressing

to this is the estimates in columns 21 to 24, which are based
on only the 43 litigated cities in the long sample. For these
estimates, t-ratio tests of nominal 5-percent size likely have
actual size of 10 percent.)

Yi,t on city effects, year effects, and on the preand postlitigation trends W1i,t ⫽ (t ⫺ i) Di1(a ⬍
t ⱕ i) ⫹ aDi1(t ⱕ a) and W2i,t ⫽ (t ⫺
i) Di1(i ⬍ t ⱕ b) ⫹ bDi1(t ⬎ b). As a 3 ⫺⬁
and b 3 ⬁, W1i,t ⫹ W2i,t 3 (t ⫺ i) Di , which is
linearly dependent on city and year effects in a
sample with Di ⫽ 1 for each city. That is, the
model is unidentified. Alternatively, a researcher
thinking not of the event study graph but rather of
a trend-break model might have defined the regressors as W̃1i,t ⫽ (t ⫺ i) Di1(t ⬍ i) and W̃2i,t ⫽
(t ⫺ i) Di1(t ⬎ i). This model is similarly unidentified: W̃1i,t ⫹ W̃2i,t ⫽ (t ⫺ i) Di.
With these caveats in mind, it is interesting to
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note that the estimates for the 92 litigated cities
are somewhat larger than the estimates that include all 314 cities. Estimates using all 314
cities can differ from those using the 92 litigated
cities only due to different estimated year effects (or region-by-year effects, etc.). It is apparent that the year effects implicit in the
estimates for the 92 litigated cities exhibit
somewhat less of an upward trend than do the
year effects from estimates for all 314 cities.
A pattern common to the estimates from both
the full and the long samples is that the richer
the set of geographical controls, the larger are
the estimated effects. For example, the state-byyear effects specification (Model 4) suggests
that the impact of litigation is at least twice that
suggested by the year effects specification
(Model 1). This pattern is particularly pronounced for the long sample estimates in the
bottom panel. This pattern strengthens the plausibility of the hypothesis that litigation is playing a causal role in black employment share
gains; if litigation merely reflected omitted factors which were correlated with black employment share gains, then we would expect
inclusion of richer geographic controls to make
the effects smaller rather than larger.32
The bottom panel of Table 3 reports postlitigation trend estimates for subsets of cities in the
long sample. These are generally similar to
those in the top panel. The estimated impact of
litigation is altered only slightly when we restrict our attention to litigated cities and when
we restrict our attention to cities contributing to
identification of Model 4.
Because of the greater confidence in the prelitigation estimates for the long sample, the bottom panel also presents estimates of the
postlitigation trend less the prelitigation trend.
In all but one case (column 21), these trendbreak estimates are larger than the simple
postlitigation trend, reflecting the negative estimated prelitigation trends for cities in the long
sample.33

32
Comparisons across these specifications could in principle be invalid, since the observations identifying Model 4
are a subset of the observations identifying Models 1, 2, and
3. However, the estimates in columns 9 through 12 indicate
that the effects are similar when the estimates are estimated
over the same subsamples.
33
It is unclear whether the postlitigation trend is more or
less appropriate than the trend-break model. For example,
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C. Social Change
In Section IIIA, above, I discussed the possibility that initial differences in the representation gap could contribute mechanically to gains
in black employment share. To address this
possibility, I assign weights to the unlitigated,
where the weights are chosen so that the reweighted distribution of the 1969 representation
gap for the unlitigated is similar to the distribution for the litigated.34 The weighting function
that achieves this balance is the ratio of the
conditional to the unconditional probability of
litigation. Such reweighting schemes are commonly used to generate counterfactual distributions (John DiNardo, Nicole Fortin, and
Thomas Lemieux 1996) and in the program
evaluation literature (e.g., Heckman et al.
1998).35
Columns 13 to 16 of Table 3 give reweighted
estimates of the postlitigation slope for the four
specifications considered above. To estimate the
conditional probability of litigation, I use a probit model with a third-degree polynomial in the
1969 representation gap; for the unconditional
probability, I use the sample average.
The estimates from this reweighting scheme
suggest that the 25-year gain in black employment
share may be slightly smaller than previously

the postlitigation trend would be more appropriate if the
negative prelitigation trend would have abated soon after
the filing date of litigation. However, the postlitigation trend
would be too conservative, and the trend-break model
would be more appropriate, if the negative prelitigation
trend would have continued in the absence of litigation.
34
One could also reweight the data to mimic the initial
distribution of the representation gap for the unlitigated or
for the average department. In this paper, I focus on addressing the counterfactual evolution of the representation
gap in litigated cities, had they never been litigated. From a
policy perspective, this is the right treatment effect to be
estimated, since future affirmative action policies of this
type would target departments with representation gaps
similar to those of the litigated.
35
The literature’s motivation for reweighting is typically
implicit rather than explicit. Here is a short proof that
reweighting balances potential confounders in distribution:
let X denote covariates to be balanced, D an indicator, g
an arbitrary bounded, continuous function, and assume p ⬅
E[D兩X] 僆 (0, 1) and  ⬅ E[D] 僆 (0, 1). Note that
E[ g(X)(1 ⫺ D)(p/1 ⫺ p)] ⫽ E[ g(X)p] and E[ g(X) D] ⫽
E[ g(X)p], implying E[ g(X)兩D ⫽ 1] ⫽ E[ g(X)w兩D ⫽ 0],
where w ⬅ (p/1 ⫺ p)/(/1 ⫺ ). The implication follows
from the converse to the Helly-Bray theorem (James Davidson 1994, Theorem 22.8).
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estimated. For example, the difference between
Model 2 in column 2 (usual weights) and Model
2 in column 14 (reweighting the unlitigated to
achieve balance) is about 0.023; that between
the estimates for Model 4 is about 0.008. A
similar reweighting exercise is performed in
columns 29 to 32 for the long sample. These
estimates suggest that the degree of overstatement in the original estimates is between 0.003
and 0.012. Unreported event study estimates of
the impact of litigation on the representation
gap, weighting by the same factor, are visually
quite similar to those presented in Figure 5.
D. Threat Effects
Testing a litigation threat effects hypothesis
requires that we specify how beliefs regarding
threats are formed. A natural approach in this
application is to consider whether unlitigated
cities respond to the litigation of other cities in
the same federal district.
To test this idea, I consider the unlitigated cities
in the full and long samples, matching each unlitigated city with a litigated city in the same
federal district.36 For cases where a single match
is available, I assign to the unlitigated city the
litigation date of the litigated city. In situations
with multiple matches, I assign to the unlitigated
city the minimum of the available dates, since that
would correspond to the first date as of which an
unlitigated city would have been alerted to the
possibility of litigation in the district.37
This matching procedure generates a sample
of unlitigated cities in the full and long samples
with neighbor-litigation dates. Some cities are
located in a state or substate area with no litigated city (e.g., the cities in Rhode Island).
These cities play the role of the unthreatened in
this analysis and are analogous to the unlitigated
in the analysis of the preceding subsections.
Figure 6 presents the event study of the impact of neighbor-litigation on the representation

36

Some federal districts (e.g., the Northern, Middle, and
Southern Districts of Alabama) were consolidated into one
state area due to a small number of cities.
37
Note that if cities respond to the national trend of
litigation by integrating, then estimation of threat effects
will require that we impose assumptions on the secular
black employment share time path in the absence of litigation. I do not consider such assumptions here and so discuss
this type of threat effect no further.

337

gap. The results are surprisingly inconsistent
with a threat effects hypothesis. The postlitigation estimates for the full sample unlitigated
cities, given in the top panel, never exceed 0.01.
Among unlitigated cities in the long sample,
given in the bottom panel of Figure 6, there
appears to be very little prelitigation trend.
Postlitigation, the estimated effects for the long
sample are negative rather than the expected
positive for both Model 3 and Model 4.
E. Robustness
Because the dependent variable in the estimation above is the simple difference between black
employment share and city fraction African
American, the estimates presented are potentially
driven by changes in city demographics, which
presumably do not respond to litigation. The most
direct way to address this concern is to reestimate
equation (3) with city fraction African American
replacing the representation gap. In results not
reported, such estimates are quite small in magnitude (generally below 1 percentage point) and
slightly positive in the postlitigation period. For all
models, reestimating equation (3) with police department black employment share as the dependent variable and including city fraction African
American as a control results in a coefficient close
to one for city fraction African American. The
robustness of the results to the manner in which
we control for city fraction African American
means that the estimates of the impact of litigation
reported in this paper apply equally to the representation gap and to police department black employment share.
While litigation is unrelated to city fraction
African American, litigation is related to black
and white flight. Reestimating equation (3) with
the log of city population replacing the representation gap indicates that litigation is associated with roughly a 10-percent decline in city
population over 25 years (results not reported).
IV. Litigation and Crime

The judges intervening in police department
hiring practices seem to have had a clear goal of
inducing police departments to hire more black
officers. It is not inconceivable, however, that
an unintended consequence of the effort was
more crime. As noted in Section I, above, police
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FIGURE 6. A DIRECT TEST

OF THE

department entrance examinations exhibit sizeable black-white test score gaps. It is fairly clear
that police department entrance examinations
test aptitude, at least to some extent. If these
exams successfully isolate aspects of aptitude
that are relevant to the job of police officer, then
the natural expectation is that hiring quotas with
bite would lead to a downgrading in the quality
of a police force, as departments are required to
hire individuals whose low test scores would
otherwise have prevented their selection.
If, however, these exams select applicants on
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LITIGATION THREAT EFFECT HYPOTHESIS

the basis of aspects of aptitude that are irrelevant
to police performance, then court-ordered hiring
quotas would be of little consequence, except to
the extent that more black officers would be hired
as a result. It has long been argued that African
Americans are more effective crime fighters than
other Americans, at least conditional on entrance
exam score (e.g., National Advisory Commission
on Civil Disorders 1968, chap. 11; National Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice Standards
and Goals 1973, 330 –33; Scott H. Decker and
Russell L. Smith 1980; Donohue and Levitt
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2001). It is possible that this effect could be strong
enough to offset any aptitude differences between
applicant groups. Moreover, in Section IVB, I
simulate the effect of quota hiring on the test score
distribution of new hires, as compared with the
traditional mechanism of rank-order hiring, disregarding race. Quantitatively, quota hiring affects
entrance exam scores of new cadets only slightly.
This suggests that aptitude differences are likely to
be small, and that net productivity effects will
reflect primarily the crime-fighting ability of the
marginally hired African American officer relative
to that of the marginally hired individual absent a
quota hiring regime.
Litigation might also afford the productivity of
incumbent officers through a morale effect. Morale and productivity effects would be expected to
manifest themselves at different time horizons.
Shortly after litigation, nearly all officers are still
incumbents, due to the low police quit rate. Thus,
productivity effects should be small and morale
effects should predominate. Many years after litigation, much of the work force will have been
replaced with officers hired under the affirmative
action regime, and productivity gains or losses
should manifest themselves more strongly. At
the same time, it is plausible that morale effects
dissipate over long time horizons, so that the
long-run effect is dominated by productivity considerations. As emphasized above, however, net
productivity reflects both the skill content of police department entrance exams and the crimefighting ability of black officers relative to that of
other officers, so the sign of any long-run effect of
litigation on police performance is theoretically
ambiguous.
Even if litigation does not affect crime, it could
affect intermediate aspects of police performance,
such as the racial composition of arrests. This
issue has been studied by Donohue and Levitt
(2001), who conclude that the hiring of black
(white) officers increases the number of white
(black) arrestees, but leaves unchanged the number of black (white) arrestees. Since litigation results in an increase in black officers at the expense
of white officers, their results imply that litigation
should decrease the number of black arrests and
increase the number of white arrests, for a decrease in the fraction black of arrestees. The evidence
presented below is consistent with this prediction,
but the magnitude of the effect is modest.
The effect of court-ordered affirmative action
on crime has also been studied by Lott (2000).
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Lott considers only affirmative action required
by DOJ consent decrees still in place as of 1987,
when public-use data on police department
black employment share become available.
Lott’s estimates imply that affirmative action
increases crime. Lott emphasizes a specific
mechanism, arguing that affirmative action over
this period involves reducing standards for applicants generally. This argument is difficult to
reconcile with the simulation of Section IVB.
Moreover, that mechanism is less plausible in
the historical context studied here, where affirmative action typically meant hiring in rank
order of test score, stratified by race—in which
case no reduction of standards for nonblack
applicants was required.38
The 19 departments still subject to consent
decrees as of 1987 are a selected sample, in two
different ways, of departments placed under affirmative action obligations. First, they do not
include those departments litigated by private
actors. Second, they do not include those departments which by 1987 had already complied
with any court-ordered affirmative action.
These considerations suggest that crime rates in
these cities may have as much to do with inflexible management as they do with changes in
work-force demographics. My own measure of
affirmative action is whether a department was
ever subject to litigation alleging hiring discrimination against African Americans. It incorporates litigation brought by both the DOJ and
private actors and does not reflect compliance
with affirmative action mandates.
A. Descriptive Statistics and Estimation
Results
I begin with a consideration of simple descriptive statistics on crime rates by litigation
status and litigation timing. For both the full and
long samples, panel C of Table 1 gives the log
crime rate for litigated and unlitigated cities at
ten-year intervals beginning in 1960. For the

38
If entrance examinations were previously job related
and were diluted of their content in order to eliminate
disparate impact, then these considerations again become
important. While there are undoubtedly examples of test
dilution, my reading of the history is that the additional
pressure to establish a fair and impartial process for deriving
test questions related to job performance on net made the
examinations more job related rather than less.
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full sample, it appears that crime rates in litigated and unlitigated cities differed by less than
10 percent until the 1990s, when crime rates fell
dramatically in the litigated cities. Among cities
in the long sample, the unlitigated had higher
crime than the litigated in 1960. Beginning in
1970, however, the crime rates in litigated and
unlitigated cities have a close correspondence.
Panel C of Table 2 gives the log crime rate for
five categories of litigation date ranges at ten-year
intervals beginning in 1960. Cities litigated in the
1977–1980 period have a 1960 crime rate that is
30 percent higher than the estimates for the other
four litigation date ranges. Between 1960 and
1970, however, the crime rate in cities that were
litigated between 1969 and 1974 and in the 1980s
soared relative to that in cities litigated in the
1977–1980 period. Between 1970 and 1999, the
crime rates in the five city groups appear to move
roughly in parallel.
Panel A of Figure 7 gives log crime rates by
litigation status for 1960 to 1999 (cf. Figure 1,
panel B). As suggested by the ten-year interval
data in Table 1, there are no discernible differences between litigated and unlitigated cities on
average following the onset of litigation. What
differences do exist are concentrated in the years
before litigation: during the 1960s, the crime rate
in litigated cities grew rapidly relative to that of
unlitigated cities. Already by 1970, however, the
crime rates had equalized. From 1970 to 1994,
crime rates in the two sets of cities were virtually
identical. Only with the late 1990s drop in crime
do any differences in crime rates emerge. The
crime rate differences at the beginning and end of
the sample appear to reflect state-by-year specific
patterns, and are largely absorbed in the state-byyear controls in the event study analysis below.
At the bottom of panel A are log policing rates
by litigation status. While litigated departments
employ more officers per capita than do unlitigated departments, there is no discernible trend
differential in this measure over time. The event
study analysis below corroborates this impression.
Panel A of Figure 7 also gives, by litigation
status, two additional police performance measures: index arrests per index crime, and the fraction of index crimes cleared.39 In principle, both
measures proxy a single phenomenon—the rate at

39
For viewing purposes, I have added 0.10 to each of the
arrest rate series.
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which officers are engaging in the apprehension of
individuals in a manner coordinated with solving
index crimes known to police (as opposed to making many prostitution arrests, for example). As
noted in Section II, however, the first proxy is
taken from two different survey forms, whereas
the second proxy is based on information from a
single form. This suggests that clearance rates are
measured with less error than arrest rates.
There is remarkable similarity between litigated and unlitigated departments in terms of
arrest rates and clearance rates. While arrest
rates exhibit a differential litigated-unlitigated
trend prior to the era of litigation, this is not
confirmed by the data on clearance rates. Indeed, clearance rates corroborate the essential
impression conveyed by crime rates: litigated
and unlitigated departments delivered roughly
similar police performance before, during, and
after litigation. The event study estimates below
suggest, however, that these broad similarities
may potentially mask some modest effect sizes.
Panel B of Figure 7 gives the fraction African
American among index crime arrestees, separately
by litigation status. Litigated departments have
always arrested substantially more African Americans than unlitigated departments. There is some
convergence in the arrest fraction black beginning
in the 1990s, but the magnitude is small.
With that backdrop, I now turn to event study
estimates of the impact of litigation on police
performance. To economize on space, I present
event study graphs only for the more interesting
results. Panel A of Figure 8 gives event study
estimates of the impact of litigation on city crime
rates. These estimates are not consistent with a
major impact of black police on crime rates, although the evident noise in the crime series means
it is difficult to detect small effect sizes.
Panel B of Figure 8 gives event study estimates for the clearance rate. While the point
estimates are generally insignificant (including
the prelitigation estimates and the longer litigation lags), there is a statistically significant drop
in clearance rates in litigated departments five to
seven years after litigation.40 The timing of the
effects is consistent with turmoil in the department. Quotas were typically imposed in these
40
For example, Model 1 estimates have t-ratios of
⫺3.45, ⫺2.32, and ⫺2.29, and Model 4 estimates have
t-ratios of ⫺3.25, ⫺3.59, and ⫺3.24. Estimates from Model
4 are significant in years 3 through 13.
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FIGURE 7. POLICE PERFORMANCE MEASURES,

cases one to three years after the filing date of
litigation, and the decline in clearances is precipitous at three years after litigation. However,
because affirmative action continued to affect
hiring in departments throughout the study period, the timing of these effects is not consistent
with net productivity differences between affirmative action hires and incumbents, as the effects dissipate after a handful of years.

BY

LITIGATION STATUS

Panel C of Figure 8 gives event study estimates for the fraction of index crime arrestees
who are African American. This series is particularly noteworthy, since the timing of the
effects is consistent with the gains in black
employment share. As noted by Donohue and
Levitt (2001), the effect of the racial composition of the police on the racial composition of
arrests could reflect many factors, including
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TABLE 4—PARAMETRIC ESTIMATES

OF THE IMPACT OF

LITIGATION

ON

Log police per 100,000 population

25 ⴱ Postlitigation trend
25 ⴱ Post-pretrend difference

POLICE PERFORMANCE

Log crime per 100,000 population

Model 1

Model 2

Model 3

Model 4

Model 1

Model 2

Model 3

Model 4

(1)
⫺0.014
(0.031)
⫺0.021
(0.084)

(2)
0.012
(0.027)
⫺0.016
(0.063)

(3)
0.016
(0.029)
⫺0.054
(0.060)

(4)
0.025
(0.036)
⫺0.104
(0.057)

(5)
⫺0.077
(0.137)
⫺0.211
(0.365)

(6)
⫺0.088
(0.062)
⫺0.078
(0.153)

(7)
⫺0.080
(0.059)
⫺0.111
(0.145)

(8)
⫺0.044
(0.050)
⫺0.024
(0.116)

Arrest rate

25 ⴱ Postlitigation trend
25 ⴱ Post-pretrend difference

Clearance rate

Model 1

Model 2

Model 3

Model 4

Model 1

Model 2

Model 3

Model 4

(9)
⫺0.072
(0.059)
0.114
(0.145)

(10)
⫺0.077
(0.059)
0.039
(0.097)

(11)
⫺0.078
(0.061)
0.012
(0.095)

(12)
⫺0.229
(0.151)
⫺0.275
(0.211)

(13)
⫺0.044
(0.041)
⫺0.001
(0.058)

(14)
⫺0.029
(0.038)
0.023
(0.054)

(15)
⫺0.035
(0.040)
0.006
(0.058)

(16)
⫺0.048
(0.032)
0.030
(0.048)

Fraction black, all arrests

25 ⴱ Postlitigation trend
25 ⴱ Post-pretrend difference
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Fraction black, all index arrests

Model 1

Model 2

Model 3

Model 4

Model 1

Model 2

Model 3

Model 4

(17)
0.007
(0.023)
0.004
(0.043)

(18)
0.004
(0.020)
⫺0.004
(0.038)

(19)
0.002
(0.018)
⫺0.006
(0.038)

(20)
⫺0.023
(0.019)
⫺0.041
(0.039)

(21)
⫺0.026
(0.020)
0.003
(0.052)

(22)
⫺0.033
(0.020)
⫺0.005
(0.044)

(23)
⫺0.033
(0.018)
⫺0.004
(0.044)

(24)
⫺0.054
(0.017)
⫺0.035
(0.045)

Notes: Standard errors, clustered at the level of the city, presented in parentheses.

changes in the probabilities of false arrest (presumably due to information processing) and
changes in the probabilities of true arrests (presumably due to officer tastes or corruption).41
Table 4 summarizes the long-run trends in these
outcomes, as well as for log police per 100,000
population, the arrest rate, and the fraction black
among all arrestees. Both the postlitigation trend
and the break in trend at the litigation filing data
are reported. The point estimates in the table are
generally small and insignificant. An important
exception is the estimate for the fraction black
among index crime arrestees, which is suggestive
of effects of affirmative action on intermediate
aspects of police performance.42

41
These are not the only effects discussed by Donohue
and Levitt (2001), but the other key effects are transmitted
through impacts on crime. The results below indicate that
the impact of litigation on crime is modest and perhaps zero.
42
Note as well that the temporary decline in clearance
rates is not captured by long-run trends.

B. The Distribution of Entrance Exam Scores
by Race
I next present evidence on the temporal evolution of the distribution of entrance examination scores by race for the New York City
Police Department. These data allow direct calculation of the difference in the distribution of
test scores of newly hired officers under various
hiring rules. For example, it is possible to calculate the distribution of test scores under the
rank-order hiring rule traditionally used by police departments, and we may compare this distribution directly with the distribution of test
scores which would result if an aggressive hiring quota were imposed. These two distributions turn out to be rather similar, suggesting a
limited role for the hypothesis that quotas increase crime by circumventing standards.
I have been able to obtain information on the
distribution of test scores by race for the 1968,
1970, 1979, and 1998 –1999 examinations.43
43

See Appendix I.
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TABLE 5—NEW YORK CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT ENTRANCE EXAMINATION SCORES
July 1968 examination
Decile
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
N

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
N

RACE, 1968 –1999

May 1970 examination

Score range

White fraction

Black fraction

Score range

White fraction

Black fraction

96–100
90–96
86–90
82–86
78–82
73–78
69–73
63–69
56–63
29–56

12.9
12.9
12.8
12.0
10.2
10.6
7.1
7.1
8.2
6.2
2,774

2.3
2.6
3.5
6.8
13.3
9.1
14.8
15.9
11.2
20.6
725

94–100
92–94
89–92
87–89
84–87
80–84
76–80
70–76
61–70
0–61

12.7
12.1
11.8
12.2
10.8
10.5
9.8
8.6
7.1
4.5
4,511

2.9
4.0
5.5
4.2
8.0
9.3
10.4
13.8
17.9
24.2
1,002

June 1979 examination1
Decile

BY

Pooled 1998–1999 examinations1

Score range

White fraction

Black fraction2

Score range

White fraction

Black fraction2

99–110
97–98
95–96
93–94
91–92
89–90
86–88
81–85
71–80
0–70

10.0
15.4
15.4
13.1
11.4
8.8
9.1
9.3
7.1
NA
19,109

3.9
5.1
8.3
9.4
10.4
10.9
14.1
17.9
18.9
NA
9,858

75–85
72–74
69–71
66–68
63–65
60–62
56–59
51–55
41–50
0–40

16.2
13.5
14.8
13.8
11.4
9.1
8.5
6.8
4.7
1.2
13,009

4.1
5.3
8.0
9.2
10.7
11.2
14.6
15.3
15.9
5.6
11,197

1

Because of test score aggregation, score ranges are approximate deciles.
Black includes African American and Latinos. For the 1968 and 1970 examinations, the distribution of scores is available
separately for African Americans and Latinos. The distributions for these two groups are quite similar.
2

For all examinations for which I have data,
Table 5 gives the fraction of white and black
applicants with scores in each decile of the
overall test score distribution. The numbers in
the table suggest that in both the 1968 and 1970
examinations, African Americans constituted
roughly 5 percent of those in the upper three
deciles and 20 percent of all applicants.
In 1972, the Guardians Association and the
Hispanic Society of the NYCPD mounted a
legal challenge to these examinations. The court
found that the city was in violation of Title VII
because the exams were insufficiently jobrelated; however, the case was declared moot
because of the mid-1970s fiscal crisis, which
was to preclude hiring in the NYCPD for a
period of several years. When the city was again
in a financial position to contemplate hiring, in
1979, the Personnel Department went to great
lengths to design an exam that was job-related:

“Exam No. 8155 is a ‘second generation’
selection procedure. Despite the various
flaws in construction of the test, it is clear
that some attempt was made to develop
the test with recognition of at least some
of the standards that courts had established in the first wave of Title VII cases.
Aware that the validity of the test would
likely have to be demonstrated, the City
performed an extensive job analysis, consciously used concepts [from the EEOC
Uniform Guidelines on Employee Selection Procedures] in determining the qualities that were being tested for, and
attempted to eliminate extraneous variables, such as the applicant’s prior knowledge, his reading level, and his ability to
complete the test in a relatively short
amount of time.”44
44

630 F. 2d 79, 89.
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Fraction of Applicants Attaining Score

0.08

345
White applicants

0.07
0.06
0.05

Pooled African American
and Latino applicants

0.04
0.03
0.02
0.01
0.00
70

75

80

85

90

95

100

105

Exam Score

Fraction of Applicants Attaining Score

A. 1979 Exam
White applicants

0.05

0.04
Pooled African American
and Latino applicants

0.03

0.02

0.01

0.00
30

40

50

60

70

80

Exam Score

B. 1998-1999 Exams
FIGURE 9. ENTRANCE EXAM SCORE DISTRIBUTIONS

After the test was administered, however, the
Guardians again challenged the test under Title
VII, because this test—although it exhibited
less disparate impact than the 1968 and 1970
exams— continued to pass whites at a much
higher rate than African Americans. For example, nonwhites constituted only 18 percent of
those among the top three deciles, despite being
34 percent of applicants.
Interestingly, the black-white test score gap
on the NYCPD entrance exam does not appear
to have changed much since 1979. Figure 9
gives separate histograms for whites, and for
African Americans and Latinos combined, for
the 1979 and 1998 –1999 examinations. Due to

BY

RACE, NYCPD

the extremely large sample sizes, and the fact
that the support of test scores is discrete, the
histogram requires no smoothing. Brief inspection of the figure reveals that although there are
substantial differences between the test score
distributions for whites and nonwhites, there are
virtually no differences in the white test score
distribution over time, and the nonwhite test
score distribution over time.
Using the data underlying Figure 9, it is a
simple matter to simulate the impact of quota
hiring on the distribution of test scores among
the newly hired. For example, from the 1979
exam, the NYCPD anticipated that all those
with scores of at least 94 would move on to the
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next phase in the selection process. Thus, all
new hires were, in the absence of court intervention, to be drawn from the extreme upper tail
of the test score distribution. The range of
scores would have naturally been from a low of
94 to a high of 110, with an average score of
96.8. In 1980, in response to the evidence regarding the difference in the distribution of test
scores by race, the district court judge ordered
that 50 percent of new hires be African American or Latino.45 I estimate that a cohort selected under this aggressive quota would have
had scores ranging from 87 to 110 and an average of 95.3. Thus, it appears that even with an
aggressive hiring quota and a visually discernible difference in test score distributions, the
average qualifications of an entering cohort
would be affected only in relatively minor
ways. While it is possible that one bad apple
spoils the bunch, the most natural model of the
effect of police officer quality on crime posits
that crime depends on the sum of officers’ test
scores. If this is the right model, then even the
most aggressive affirmative action measures
would not be expected to affect city crime rates
through effects on the distribution of aptitude
among entering cohorts.
V. Conclusion

This paper has examined the impact of class
action employment discrimination litigation on
black employment share and police performance in 314 large municipal police departments. Regarding the impact of litigation on
black employment share, the evidence points to
several key conclusions. First, the litigation of
the 1970s was targeted at big cities with large
and growing African American populations and
low black employment share. Second, despite
substantial initial differences between litigated
and unlitigated cities, by 1999 litigated cities’
representation gap was largely equal to that of
unlitigated cities. Third, this convergence appears to have occurred almost entirely in the
years following litigation. Fourth, although unlitigated cities with large initial representation
45

Guardians Association of the New York City Police
Department v. New York City Police Department, 484 F.
Supp. 785, 799 (S.D. New York, 1980). This example is for
illustrative purposes only; the 50-percent hiring quota was
subsequently softened by the appeals court (630 F. 2d 79).
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gaps exhibit more convergence than cities with
small gaps, this pattern is not strong enough to
account for the gains accruing to litigated cities.
Fifth, there is little evidence supporting a threat
effect hypothesis. In particular, litigated cities
do not appear to exhibit any gains in black
employment share prior to litigation, and unlitigated cities do not appear to integrate following
the filing of the first class action employment
discrimination suit in their state.
On the whole, I interpret the evidence summarized in this paper as consistent with a major
role for the federal courts in integrating police
departments in the United States. My best estimate of the 25-year gain in police department
black employment share is 10 percentage
points, and the effect is estimated with some
precision. Because of the low attrition rate of
police officers, this is consistent with a hiring
fraction African American roughly 14 percentage points above the prelitigation police department fraction black.
In contrast to the estimated impact of litigation
on police department black employment share, I
find little evidence of an impact of litigation on
crime. This may be because of a complex series of
effects that offset one another. For example, there
is some evidence that litigation led to turmoil in
the department, temporarily reducing clearance
rates, which presumably encouraged crime. However, this effect on crime is not detectable, perhaps
because African American officers are more productive crime fighters than other Americans.
The analysis in this paper rules out one mechanism by which litigation might have been expected to affect crime. Police departments’
standard practice is to hire in rank order by test
score, and judges handing down quotas typically
allowed departments to continue to do so, but
required that they do so separately by race. Using
data on test score distributions in New York City,
thought to be representative of those for all police
departments, I show that in such a context, even
aggressive hiring quotas change the test score
distribution of new hires only minimally. This
suggests that the magnitude of any aptitude differences induced by quota hiring is small, even for
long-term quota hiring regimes. Unless African
Americans fare much better on the New York City
Police Department entrance examinations than on
the entrance examinations of other cities, these
conclusions would seem to hold for police departments generally.
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APPENDIX I: DATA
Sample of Cities: The 314 cities for study
were selected from among those U.S. municipalities with the largest police and fire departments,
on the basis of the Census of Governments from
1972, 1977, 1982, 1987, 1992, and 1997. The
specific mechanism for selection was as follows.
First, I merged the employment counts by function of government for all municipal respondents
in the years noted above. Average employment
levels over the period were computed. There were
328 cities whose average police and fire employment levels placed them in the top 400 nationally
of both categories. These cities were then sought
in the electronic files of the EEO-4 survey. Satisfactory data for 314 cities were available. Most of
the cities unable to be matched are quite small.
However, Washington, D.C., and San Francisco
were excluded from the analysis because survey
responses from these cities were not available
until the 1980s.46 The resulting sample is comprised of 314 cities in all 9 census regions, and in
all but the least populated of the 48 contiguous
states.47
Black Police Officer Data: Data on police
department demographics are obtained primarily from the EEO-4 survey of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC),
conducted annually by the EEOC since 1973.48
These data are confidential, but may be made
available to researchers. Tabulations of these
data have typically been published by the EEOC
and are available in libraries (see, for example,
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
1999). Previous researchers have been able to
access electronic files for 1980, 1984, 1985,
1987, 1989, 1990, 1991, 1993, 1995, 1997, and
1999. As part of the research for this study, I
traveled to the EEOC and recovered the 1973
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and 1974 surveys. Electronic files in EBCDIC
and packed decimal format were available, but
codebooks were not. Aided by the institutional
knowledge of Ron Edwards, I inferred a codebook for these data and constructed electronic
files. In EEOC headquarters, I located several
nine-track reels containing the only known copies of the 1982 EEO-4 survey. Unfortunately,
these reels had experienced a high degree of
physical degradation, and only half of the
records from the 1982 survey are available. In
the Alexandria warehouse of the EEOC, I located microfilm records for 1975, 1977, and
1981. A team of research assistants entered
these data for all cities (1975 and 1977) and for
those cities missing 1980 records (1981). The
1981 records are important, since large cities
are systematically missing in 1980.49 The city
identifiers assigned by the EEOC had a small
number of errors for the years 1980 to 1999,
which I corrected manually using name and
address information for each city. Identifiers for
1973 and 1974 also do not conform to the 1980
identifiers; for these years, I created a full crosswalk for all identifiers.
Because the first EEO-4 survey was not conducted until 1973, further data on the number of
African American officers in police departments were collected from several historical
sources. The most nationally comprehensive is
the International City Manager Association
(1970), which details the number of “minority
group employees-uniformed.” I interpret these
numbers as the number of African American
and Latino officers and have discounted them
by the estimated 1973 fraction of African American and Latino officers who were African
American. The other nationally comprehensive
survey comes from unpublished research
(Raper 1940) on “Negro policemen” upon
which Gunnar Myrdal (1944) relied.50 Raper’s
research led to surveys of Southern police de-

46

The fire and police departments of San Francisco were
litigated in 1970 and 1973, respectively. The police department of Washington, D.C., was litigated in 1970.
47
Montana, North Dakota, Vermont, and Wyoming are
all unrepresented. The 2000 population ranks of these states
among the 48 contiguous states are 43, 46, 47, and 48,
respectively.
48
Beginning in 1991, the EEOC has conducted the
EEO-4 survey only once every two years. The 1972 Equal
Employment Opportunity Act granted authority to the
EEOC to collect data from public employers, expanding the
EEOC’s older data collection authority regarding private
employers (conferred by the 1964 Civil Rights Act).

49
For example, neither New York nor Los Angeles is
included in the 1980 file. The source of this problem appears
to be that electronically submitted returns were ironically
not included in the electronic file compiled by the contractor
for the 1980 survey. Data for cities located on the same
microfilm reel as a city with missing data were also included.
50
Comparing 1930 and 1940 Census published totals of
African American police officers with Raper’s estimates
suggests that Raper identified the employers of some 90
percent of the black police officers in the country.
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partments spanning 1947 to 1969. Raper was a
longtime writer for the Commission on Interracial Cooperation, which the Southern Regional
Council (SRC) succeeded in 1944. From 1947
to 1954, the SRC continued Raper’s surveys of
the number of “Negro uniformed policemen,
detectives (plainclothes), and policewomen” for
Southern municipalities, publishing results annually in New South.51
Publication of these numbers ceased after
1954, as the SRC focused its efforts on school
desegregation and voter registration (Elliott M.
Rudwick 1961). However, Rudwick conducted
surveys of Southern police departments in 1954,
1959, and 1961 and the SRC published the
results in Rudwick (1962). Then, in 1969, the
SRC attempted what was to be its final survey
of Southern police departments. The results of
the survey were not published, but the data are
available in recently published microfilm
records (Southern Regional Council 2000, Reel
111 (434), 289 –98).
For non-Southern cities, data on the number
of “Negro police” in 1954 for a small number of
cities are published in Kephart (1954) and
Kephart (1957). Data on larger cities’ black
employment share have also been published in
the reports of several presidential and gubernatorial commissions: President’s Commission on
Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice
(1967), National Advisory Commission on
Civil Disorders (1968), and National Advisory
Commission on Criminal Justice Standards and
Goals (1973). Finally, it appears that the U.S.
Commission on Civil Rights conducted a survey of employment of African American police
officers in 230 departments in 1962 (President’s
Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice 1967, 167– 68). However,
the Commission did not publish this work, the
Commission Library does not possess a copy,
and the survey results are not part of the National Archives’ holdings of the Commission’s
papers. I believe this is the only nationally comprehensive survey information on the employment of black police officers not included in the
data used for this study.
51

Outline of volumes used: October 1947, Vol. 2, No.
10, p. 9; September 1948, Vol. 3, No. 9, p. 7; September
1949, Vol. 4, No. 9, p. 9; September–October 1950, Vol. 5,
Nos. 9 and 10, p. 6; September 1952, Vol. 7, No. 9, p. 6; and
October–November 1953, Vol. 8, Nos. 10 and 11, pp. 6 –7.
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The historical sources consulted allowed estimation of 1969 black employment share for all
314 cities under study. Because litigation began
in 1969, this is an important aspect of the data
collection undertaken here. For a subset of 120
cities, referred to in the body of the text as the
“long sample,” data on black employment share
for 1960 to 1969 are available. Data on black
employment share were combined with data on
city fraction African American (linearly interpolated between census years).
I also use an administrative dataset on police
officers in the Chicago Police Department
(CPD), provided to me by Adam Kingsley of
the City of Chicago Department of Law following a records request. The dataset contains, for
every individual who has worked for the CPD
since approximately the late 1970s, a hiring
date, a termination date, race, and other information not used here. Details on the construction of this dataset from CPD administrative
records is provided in Bernard R. Siskin and
David W. Griffin (1997). I use these data to
construct a sample of CPD police officers for all
years from 1960 to 1997. Using the Uniform
Crime Reports (UCR), I estimated the sampling
rate for each of these extracts. From a low of 40
percent in 1960, the rate rises smoothly in time,
arriving at a constant level of 95–105 percent
beginning in 1977. The sampling rate for African American officers is higher than that of
other officers for the early years (sources on
black police available for 1962, 1967, and
1969). I estimate the black sampling rate in
these years to be 80, 76, and 70 percent. These
rates are to be compared to the overall rates of
50, 65, and 71 percent, respectively. The downward trend in Figure 1 in hiring fraction African
American pre-1970 is likely an artifact of this
phenomenon, but the 1974 spike may not be
attributed to this because the sampling rates
were similar already in 1969.
Litigation Data: To learn which cities were
litigated, I read over 1,300 published decisions
in which hiring discrimination against African
Americans on the part of the city police or city
fire department was alleged.52 These decisions
52

Interested researchers may obtain additional records
(e.g., unpublished decisions and consent decrees) on the
cases studied here by contacting the federal district court in
which the case originated. That strategy was not pursued
here due to cost.
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were located in a multistep process. First, for all
314 cities under study, a keyword search on
“discrimination,” “black,” and “police”/“fire”
was conducted in conjunction with the name of
the city (e.g., “Norfolk”). Second, the resulting
list of cases was scanned and those deemed
potentially relevant were selected for skimming.
In the third step, decisions determined to pertain
to discrimination against either the police or fire
department in the city were read in their entirety
(preliminary research indicated that judges in
fire department cases frequently mention litigation against the police department in the same
city). Fourth, all cases cited by each of those
decisions as pertaining to discrimination cases
were consulted. Two pieces of evidence suggest
that this strategy led to a relatively complete
record of the litigation. First, only a handful of
cases identified in the fourth step had not already been located using keyword searches.
Second, the cases listed in U.S. Department of
Justice (2001) are a strict subset of the cases
located by the first search method.
It was not possible to determine which departments were subject to quotas during which
time periods. Because of unpublished decisions
and judicial choices regarding what to discuss in
the text of an opinion, information on quotas is
much more poorly measured than whether a city
was litigated, and the date the litigation began.
Litigation filing dates were determined by reference to the first two digits of the Civil Action
Number (CAN) for located cases. Because litigation filing dates are embedded in the CAN,
the location of even one published decision
pertaining to a case results in knowledge of the
filing year.
Crime Data: Data on crime and police
staffing were obtained from the Uniform Crime
Reports available from the Inter-university
Consortium for Political and Social Research
(ICPSR) for 1975 to 1999. Data prior to 1975
are not available from ICPSR, but are available
from the FBI.53
Entrance Exam Data: The 1968 and 1970
data are from Chaiken and Cohen (1973). The
1979 data are from Guardians Association of
the New York City Police Department v. the

53

These files were obtained with the help of Joanne
Vanatta of the Programs Support Section of the FBI, Ron
Edwards of the EEOC, and Rick Kawin of UC Berkeley.
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New York City Police Department, 630 F. 2d
79, 103 (2nd Cir., 1980). The 1998 –1999 data
were obtained from the NYCPD following a
records request.
City Demographics Data: City demographics such as fraction African American and population were taken from the population censuses
for 1960, 1970, 1980, 1990, and 2000, and
linearly interpolated between census years.
Electronic files were available for all years except for 1960, where I substituted published
tabulations.54
Riot Data: Data on riots from 1961 to 1968
are taken from the Data and Program Library
Service at the University of Wisconsin.
Availability of Data: A series of electronic
files containing all data and programs used for
this paper are available for researchers with
access to EEOC data files. Interested researchers should contact Ron Edwards at the EEOC.
APPENDIX II: USING QUIT RATES TO PREDICT
CHANGES IN HIRING PRACTICES
This appendix justifies the approximation in
(1). Let NBt and Nt denote the number of black
and all officers, respectively, at time t; Ht the
number of officers hired between t ⫺ 1 and t; qBt
the quit rate of black officers; and ft the hiring
fraction African American. The identity
(5)

N Bt ⫽ N tB⫺ 1 ⫺ N tB⫺ 1 q tB⫺ 1 ⫹ H t f t

states simply that the number of black officers
in period t is equal to the number of black
officers in period t ⫺ 1, less the number of black
officers quitting, plus the number of black officers hired. Dividing both sides by the number
of total officers implies
(6)

Ft ⫽

N Bt
N tB⫺ 1
Ht
⫽
共1 ⫺ q tB⫺ 1 兲 ⫹
f
Nt
Nt
Nt t

⫽

N tB⫺ 1 N t ⫺ 1
Ht
共1 ⫺ q tB⫺ 1 兲 ⫹
f
Nt ⫺ 1 Nt
Nt t

54
For 1970, information in the electronic file was missing for East Hartford and West Hartford, Connecticut, and
Brookline, Massachusetts, and published tabulations were
again used.
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⫽

1 ⫺ q tB⫺ 1
Ft ⫺ 1 ⫹ ht ft
1 ⫹ t

(8) F t ⫽

where ␥t ⫺ 1 ⫽ (1 ⫺ qBt⫺1)/(1 ⫹ t), ht is the new
hires rate and, as in the main text, Ft denotes the
black employment share in period t, and t is the
year-over-year growth rate in the size of the
work force (i.e., t ⫽ (Nt ⫺ Nt ⫺ 1)/Nt ⫺ 1). Iterating on this recursion yields

冘⌫

k⫺1

F t ⫽ ⌫ t,k F t ⫺ k ⫹

t,j

ht ⫺ j ft ⫺ j

j⫽0

⫽ ⌫ t,k F t ⫺ k ⫹ h f

冘⌫

k⫺1

t,j

j⫽0

冘

k⫺1

⫹ Ĉ关h t ⫺ j , f t ⫺ j 兴

冉 冊

再 冉 冊冎

1 ⫺ q k
1 ⫺ q
Ft ⫺ k ⫹ 1 ⫺
1 ⫹ 
1 ⫹ 

k

f ,

which we recognize as (1). Letting ␣ ⫽ ((1 ⫺
q )/(1 ⫹  ))k, we have

⬅ ␥t ⫺ 1 Ft ⫺ 1 ⫹ ht ft ,

(7)

MARCH 2007

⌫ t,j ,

j⫽0

where ⌫t, j ⫽ 兿ji⫽1 ␥t ⫺ i for j ⬎ 0 and ⌫t, j ⫽ 1
for j ⫽ 0, Ĉ[ht ⫺ j , ft ⫺ j] is the weighted covariance of the hiring fraction African American
and the hiring rates over the past k periods, h is
the weighted average of hiring rates, and f is the
weighted average of the hiring fraction African
American, with weights proportional to ⌫t, j and
summing to one.
I now consider simplifying assumptions designed to allow something meaningful to be
said about the likely fraction African American
among new hires, given information solely on
gains in the black employment share and an
estimate of the quit rate. Two assumptions
which are sufficient are:
A1. Quit Rates, Hiring Rates, and the Hiring
Fraction African American are Constant: q ⫽
q , h ⫽ h , and f ⫽ f, for  僆 {t ⫺ k, t ⫺ k ⫹
1, ... , t ⫺ 1, t}.
A2. Black Quit Rates are Equal to Overall Quit
Rates: qB ⫽ q for  僆 {t ⫺ k, t ⫺ k ⫹ 1, ... ,
t ⫺ 1, t}.
Since ht ⬅ (t ⫹ qt ⫺ 1)/(1 ⫹ t), Assumptions
A1 and A2 imply t ⬅  , leading to the identity

(9)

f ⫺ F t ⫺ k ⫽

1
共F ⫺ F t ⫺ k 兲,
1⫺␣ t

which we recognize as the conversion equation
(2). An alternative set of sufficient assumptions
is also available, recorded here as B1 through B3:
B1. Black Quit Rates and Employment Growth
Rates are Small: qB and  are near zero for
each  僆 {t ⫺ k, t ⫺ k ⫹ 1, ... , t ⫺ 1, t}.
B2. Hiring Rates and the Hiring Fraction African American are Uncorrelated: C[h, f] ⫽ 0
for  僆 {t ⫺ k, t ⫺ k ⫹ 1, ... , t ⫺ 1, t}.
B3. Law of Large Numbers: qt, qBt , and ht are
covariance stationary and jointly ergodic, and k
is large.
Assumptions B1 and B3 imply that A1 holds
approximately. For example, a second-order
Taylor approximation for ln(1 ⫹ x) shows that
(10) ⌫t,k ⫽ exp共⫺k兵q B ⫹  其兲 exp共12 k兵V̂关qtB⫺ i兴
1

⫹ 共q B兲2}) exp共2 k兵V̂关t ⫺ i 兴 ⫹ 共 兲2其兲 ⫹ õ,
where õ is a general representation for an
error which is (here, to second-order) small
when black quit rates and employment growth
rates are small, and now q and  denote the
simple averages of quit and employment
growth rates, respectively.55 Under B3, the terms
1⁄2 k{V̂[qB ] ⫹ (q
 B)2} and 1⁄2 k{V̂[t⫺i] ⫹ ( )2}
t⫺i
are small if quit rates are small relative to k,
leading to ⌫t,k ⬇ ((1 ⫺ q B)/(1 ⫹  ))k (another
Taylor expansion shows this is approximately
equal to the first factor in (10)).
To assess the numerical accuracy of this approximation, consider a simulation with parameters relevant for the context of this paper. Suppose
55
Note that since the ⌫t,k are bounded, under B3, the
simple and weighted averages are equal in probability.
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k ⫽ 25, qBt is distributed uniformly between 0.03
and 0.05, and t is distributed uniformly between
0.005 and 0.015. Then, ((1 ⫺ q B)/(1 ⫹  ))k has
an average percentage error for ⌫t,k of 5.2 percent, with a near perfect correlation.56
Since the weights ⌫t, j are bounded, assumpp
tions B2 and B3 imply that Ĉ[ht ⫺ j , ft ⫺ j] ⫽ 0,
and assumption
B3 and Slutsky’s theoremp imp
ply that h ⫽ ( ⫹ q )/(1 ⫹  ), where Ak ⫽ Bk
means that Ak and Bk share a probability limit.
This leads to
(11)

冉 冊

1 ⫺ q B k
Ft ⫽
Ft ⫺ k
1 ⫹ 
p

⫹

再 冉

1 ⫺ q B
 ⫹ q
1⫺
B
 ⫹ q
1 ⫹ 

冊冎
k

f ⫹ õ

(cf. (1)). Letting ␣ ⫽ (1 ⫺ q B)/(1 ⫹  ) and ␦ ⫽
( ⫹ q )/( ⫹ q B), we obtain

␦f ⫺ F t ⫺ k ⬇

1
共F ⫺ F t ⫺ k 兲
1⫺␣ t

(cf. (2)). This implies that (1/(1 ⫺ ␣))(Ft ⫺
Ft ⫺ k) will understate the regime-shift in the
hiring fraction African American if q B ⬎ q and
will overstate the regime-shift if q B ⬍ q .
In the text, I implement this approximation
technique using a year-over-year growth rate
estimate of 1 percent and a quit rate of 4 percent. While the year-over-year growth rate is
observed directly, the quit rate is not. However,
4 percent is in line with the available evidence.
The Chicago data described in Section II yield
an estimated quit rate of 3.6 percent.57 Butterfield (2001) notes that “[i]n New York City,
more than 1,700 officers left the 41,000-member force last year through retirement or resignation, a third more than the year before”
(implied quit rate estimates of 1700/41000 ⬟
0.041 and 1275/41000 ⬟ 0.031). More historically, the District Court of the Eastern District
of Pennsylvania reports that “[a]s of September
56
On average across 10,000 replications, ((1 ⫺ q B)/(1 ⫹
 ))k was 0.281, while ⌫t,k was 0.267. The overstatement is
attributable to quit rates being generally larger than employment growth rates in the chosen example.
57
For the sample of officers in the force between 1979
and 1997. Before 1979, it appears that the quit rate is
artificially low due to the sampling scheme.
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22, 1972 there were 8,082 members of the [Philadelphia] Police Department. ... [D]efendants
estimate that 96 persons presently employed on
the Police Force will no longer be employed on
the Police Force as of January 1, 1973” (estimate of 96[365/(8 ⫹ 31 ⫹ 30 ⫹ 31)]/8082 ⬟
0.043).58
Further corroboration of this quit rate estimate is available from the 1991–1992 Police
Use of Force survey (Antony M. Pate and Lori
E. Fridell 1994), which reports average years of
service among several hundred large municipal
police departments to be 11.3. If T denotes
completed time of service, then to maintain a
constant work-force size, a department will hire
1/T of its work force at each point in time, and
among those working, average time of service
will be 兰T0 x(1/T) dx ⫽ (T/2). Thus, 11.3 average
years of service among current workers translates into average completed years of service of
22.6 — or a quit rate of about 1/22.6 ⬟ 0.044.
This estimate is likely slightly overstated, because T ⬎ 2 䡠 11.3 in a growing department,
since entering cohorts must become progressively larger.
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